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I. INTRODUCTION
For human rights advocates, the present era is a time of reflection. This is
partly because, in several countries, authoritarian patterns old and new are
restricting scope for dissent and contestation—a trend that increases the need
but reduces the space for human rights strategies.1 At a deeper level, however,
wide-ranging critiques over the past two decades have questioned the viability
of human rights as a vehicle for emancipatory action.
Critiques of rights are not new and have taken different forms.2 But growing public concerns about economic inequality have sparked more recent
commentary about the role human rights may have played in abetting and even
sustaining the perceived ills of global economic ordering—including poverty,
dispossession and exploitation.3 The historical overlap, since the 1970s, between the rise to prominence of human rights in public discourse and mobilization on the one hand, and the deepening of neoliberal economic configurations on the other, has sustained these debates.4
The new wave of critique has emerged at a time when many social movements mobilize human rights to frame their action in pursuit of social justice,
from challenging land grabbing and labor exploitation, to promoting fairer
terms of inclusion in global value chains. Over time, the critique could foster
shifts in the discursive practices that underpin social justice advocacy. But the
present coexistence of a new surge in the critique of rights on the one hand,
and of mobilizing rights in social struggles on the other, raises questions about
the relation between critical theory and emancipatory action.5
1

Philip Alston, Human Rights Under Siege, 14 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 267, 268
(2017).
2
See, e.g., RADHA D’SOUZA, WHAT’S WRONG WITH RIGHTS? SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, LAW
AND LIBERAL IMAGINATIONS xiv (2018); Wendy Brown, “The Most We Can Hope For
. . .”: Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q. 451 (2004); David
Kennedy, International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?, 15 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 101 (2002); see also Ben Golder, Beyond Redemption? Problematising the Critique
of Human Rights in Contemporary International Legal Thought, 2 LONDON REV. OF INT’L
L. 77, 80 (providing a “critique of the critique”).
3
For diverse positions on this debate, see, e.g., JOHN LINARELLI, MARGON SALOMON &
MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNAJAH, THE MISERY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT
ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018); Susan Marks, Four Human
Rights Myths (LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 10/2012, 2012), https://ssrn.com/abst
ract=2150155.
4
MOYN, supra note 3.
5
Paul O’Connell, On the Human Rights Question, 40 HUM. RTS. Q. 962, 963 (2018)
(“This disjuncture—between critical theory and critical practice—raises . . . questions
about the relationship between ideas and social movements, law and struggles to bring
about social change, and . . . about the role of human rights in emancipatory politics.”); see
also Zachary Manfredi, Recent Histories and Uncertain Futures: Contemporary Critiques
of International Human Rights and Humanitarianism, 22 QUI PARLE 3 (2013).
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International law has long provided fertile ground for the interplay of human rights and social justice. International tribunals have adjudicated on human rights claims that were informed by a concern for social justice, for example, with regards to the litigation that indigenous peoples initiated to defend
or reclaim their ancestral lands.6 Similarly, the international bodies responsible for interpreting human rights treaties have had to grapple with social justice issues in the elaboration of their jurisprudence, and the involvement of
activists in the development of new international human rights instruments
has become an increasingly significant occurrence.
Outside the realm of institutionalized proceedings, public advocacy in
wide-ranging socio-political arenas has often invoked the terms, and the authority, of international human rights treaties to advance social justice goals.7
This role of international law in the interface between human rights and social
justice means that the recent surge in the critique of rights raises questions
about the theory and practice of international law, and ultimately about the
emancipatory potential of international law itself.
This Article reflects on the place of human rights, particularly international
human rights law, in strategies to advance social justice. It argues that, while
some critique takes aim at an encompassing human rights “project,” the contested nature of human rights calls for more granular analyses that consider
the diverse constellations of actors, agendas, arenas, and approaches connecting human rights to social justice. And while much public debate has focused
on institutionalized human rights actors and frameworks, the article identifies
human rights’ primary emancipatory promise in the agency of the social actors—indigenous peoples, agrarian movements, trade unions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), grassroots groups—that have appropriated and
in some cases reconfigured human rights from the bottom up.
Examples include international litigation to validate new interpretations of
long-recognized rights; public campaigning for new international instruments
to shift the contours of human rights; and invoking internationally recognized
rights to change public discourses in local to global policy arenas. This recentring of the discussion around how social actors mobilize internationally
recognized human rights is part of a wider shift in the way international law
is conceived of, not just as a practice located in the global centers of

6
See, e.g., Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Apr. 1, 2011) (requiring consultations that are “culturally informed,” among other social justice-based concerns).
7
Sylvia Arzey & Luke McNamara, Invoking International Human Rights Law in a
“Rights-Free Zone”: Indigenous Justice Campaigns in Australia, 33 HUM. RTS. Q. 733,
735 (2011) (analyzing the efficacy of the invocation of human rights in aboriginal public
advocacy in Australia).
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international diplomacy, but as a phenomenon that is both experienced and to
some extent shaped at the grassroots as well.8
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows. Section II briefly
outlines the relation between human rights and social justice, cursorily reviewing—and critically engaging with—some of the main strands of the recent critique of rights. Section II also articulates the case for disaggregating
the interface between human rights and social justice in the light of two interlinked but distinctive modes of human rights advocacy: “reactive” strategies,
whereby recourse to existing human rights concepts and instruments responds
to specific instances or patterns of social injustice; and “constitutive” strategies, whereby advocacy aims for a more foundationally normative reconfiguration of human rights themselves, in pursuit of longer-term social justice
goals.
Sections III and IV examine two case studies of “reactive” and “constitutive” forms of rights-claiming to distil qualitative insights on the place of human rights in social justice strategies. While much debate about the relation
between human rights and social justice has been primarily grounded in European and North American experiences, the analysis deliberately focuses on
experiences of advocacy conducted by actors that are located, at least in part,
in the “global South,” often through alliances that cut across conventional
North-South divides, and largely outside the mainstream “human rights movement,” in order to facilitate fuller consideration of the geographic and ideological diversity of human rights activism.
The first case study, discussed in Section III, concerns the “reactive” use
of human rights in indigenous peoples’ struggles to challenge the award of
commercial natural resource concessions in their ancestral territories. This
case study relies particularly heavily on human rights litigation and jurisprudential developments that occurred within the regional human rights systems
of Africa and the Americas. The second case study (Section IV) considers the
use of human rights in “constitutive” strategies to transform the economic paradigm that underpins the global food system. This part focuses on the
longstanding and ultimately successful advocacy of international agrarian
movements for the adoption, by the United Nations General Assembly, of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas.9
Each of the two case studies is examined though a common socio-legal
prism that interrogates: i) the political and juridical terrain from which the
8
See generally LUIS ESLAVA, LOCAL SPACE, GLOBAL LIFE: THE EVERYDAY OPERATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (2015); see also Lorenzo Cotula, Land, Property and Sovereignty in International Law, 25 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 219 (2017);

Sarah Mason-Case, On Being Companions and Strangers: Lawyers and the Production of
International Climate Law, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 625 (2019).
9
G.A. Res. 73/165, U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas (Dec. 17, 2018).
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relevant rights-claiming practices emerged; ii) any normative reconfigurations
the rights-claiming led to, whether in the form of jurisprudential developments
or international (soft) law making; and iii) whether and how rights-claiming
ultimately achieved the changes sought in social, political, and economic trajectories.
While extremely diverse in their actors, agendas, arenas and approaches,
the two case studies illustrate the ways in which social actors have wielded
human rights to reclaim land, resources and territories, to renegotiate control
over national development pathways, and to challenge aspects of global economic ordering. These aspects range from the “extractivist” paradigm
whereby large-scale agribusiness, mining, petroleum and hydro projects are
converting indigenous lands to commodity extraction, all the way to control
over the means of production and value chain relations in the context of global
food systems.
The conclusion (Section V) develops cross-cutting reflections based on the
findings of the two case studies, comparing the operation of reactive and constitutive modes, and identifying areas for cross-fertilization between the two.
The reflections highlight the inherent limitations of mobilizing human rights
concepts that are ultimately implicated with dominant economic and political
structures. But they also point to conscious efforts to appropriate, and to some
extent reconfigure, human rights in social struggles. The findings suggest that,
while critiques of rights identify real problems, there is a need to broaden current debates, recognise the diversity of human rights forms, and more fully
consider the practices of actors located outside the human rights mainstream.
By shifting the focus from institutionalized human rights actors and frameworks, to rights-claiming as a practice of contestation, it might become possible to ask different questions about whether and how human rights can sustain
emancipatory action.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: ANATOMY OF THE CRITIQUE—
AND OF ITS LIMITS
A. On Social Justice
The relation between human rights and social justice raises complex, multifaceted issues. This is partly because there are many conceptions of social
justice, which have formed the object of variegated philosophical and political
debates. Suffice it to say, for the purposes of this study, that a traditional emphasis in some social justice theories on the distribution of primarily material
assets within or among national polities, and ultimately on the role of the state
in national and international institutional configurations,10 has been
10
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
PEOPLES (2001).

OF JUSTICE

(1999); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW

OF
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complemented by ideas of justice that, to diverse extents: more explicitly consider issues of recognition and representation;11 focus on human capabilities
rather than material goods alone;12 and engage with the global and transnational dimensions of political and economic ordering.13
A framing that complements distributive issues with questions of identity
and status (recognition), and of power and politics (representation),14 provides
a useful point of departure for interrogating the place of international human
rights law in social justice advocacy. Some recent scholarly debates have
placed particular emphasis on the interface between human rights and economic (in)equality.15 In effect, economic inequality reflects one subset of (primarily distributive) issues within a broader social justice framing. While inequality is more easily measurable and more directly resonates with public
concerns currently debated in many polities, a more encompassing social justice framing can more effectively capture the broad spectrum of issues and
relations that are associated with contemporary global ordering.
B. The Critique in Outline
Critiques of human rights are rooted in diverse normative perspectives,
and it is impossible to do justice to them in the limited space available. By
way of extreme synthesis, critics have developed both complementary and
diverging accounts of what they see as the failure of human rights to confront
injustice in socio-economic relations.
Some critics have argued that deep-level commonalities exist between human rights and capitalist organization, particularly the emphasis that both
place on individual autonomy, and on the agency of the individual as a political and economic actor.16 These critics have noted that certain human rights
are instrumental to, and inherently associated with, the functioning of dominant economic models (for example, the role of the right to property in

11
See, e.g., NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE (Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke
trans., 2003).
12
See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press
2009).
13
See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2008); KOR-CHOR
TAN, TOLERATION, DIVERSITY, AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2000).
14
See Nancy Fraser, Hanne M. Dahl, Pauline Stolz, & Rasmus Willig, Recognition, Redistribution and Representation in Capitalist Global Society: An Interview with Nancy
Fraser, 47 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 374 (2004).
15
See, e.g., MOYN, supra note 3.
16
For a discussion of these positions, see Zak Manfredi, Compatibility as Complicity?
On Neoliberalism and Human Rights, Law and Political Economy, L. & POL. ECON. BLOG
(May 28, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/05/28/compatibility-as-complicity-on-neoliberal
ism-and-human-rights/.
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underpinning capitalist modes of production), and that public discourses have
mobilized human rights to legitimize neoliberal economic reforms.17 In these
accounts, human rights have, in effect, sustained the foundations of an unjust
economic order.18
Another body of critique has interrogated the perceived lack of ambition
or effectiveness of human rights in confronting injustice, arguing that human
rights “settled for preventing and mitigating deprivations but not changing the
terms under which that suffering is not only made possible but is reproduced.”19 In these—admittedly diverse and not always converging—accounts, human rights are potentially an emancipatory force, but they have
failed to advance a truly transformative agenda that challenges unjust socioeconomic relations. Rather, they have been primarily interpreted as establishing a minimum level of provision, a social safety net, to ensure that certain
“basic needs” are met.20
These arguments, articulated in recent academic and policy debates, need
to be understood in the light of a longer term ideational stratification of critiques, including Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives, that have questioned
the conceptual framing of human rights and its historical association with liberal political theory21 and delineated human rights as involving a fundamentally state-centric and conservative theory of change that can displace more
radical “political and moral possibilities.”22
The recent wave of critique also ties in with a longstanding body of empirically grounded studies that pointed to the limitations of human rights in
real-life social justice strategies. In some of these accounts, recourse to law
inherently marginalizes the poor, because it shifts agency from social actors
to legal professionals, in situations where the respective visions are often misaligned.23 For example, some argue that disadvantaged groups may pragmatically prefer political engagement and negotiation over human rights

17

Jessica Whyte, Powerless Companions or Fellow Travellers? Human Rights and the
Neoliberal Assault on Post-Colonial Economic Justice, RADICAL PHIL. (June 2018), https://
www.radicalphilosophy.com/article/powerless-companions-or-fellow-travellers. On use
of rights language to advance neoliberal reform, see QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE
END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM 120–45 (2018).
18
Whyte, supra note 17.
19
LINARELLI ET AL., supra note 3, at 228.
20
MOYN, supra note 3, at 162–73.
21
See D’SOUZA, supra note 3.
22
Jarrett Zignon, Maintaining the “Truth”: Performativity, Human Rights, and the Limitations on Politics, 17 THEORY & EVENT (2014), https://muse.jhu.edu/article/553385.
23
Sheela Patel & Diana Mitlin, Reinterpreting the Rights-Based Approach: A Grassroots Perspective on Rights and Development, in RIGHTS-BASED APPROACHES TO
DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS 107, 108 (Sam Hickey & Diana
Mitlin eds., 2009).
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strategies that are deemed to be inherently confrontational and capable of
damaging important social relations.24
Overall, critiques of rights command a substantial evidence base spanning
different phases of contemporary human rights processes, both in relation to
constitutional law in a variety of national contexts, and to the development
and implementation of international human rights law. There is little doubt,
for example, that many human rights concepts have historically emerged in
connection with a political tradition that emphasises protecting individual
rights against the exercise of state power, and that is coextensive with the architecture of the global capitalist economy.
This does not mean that human rights’ contemporary horizon is restricted
to one political project or economic model. Developments in international law
have taken human rights in diverse directions, including the explicit recognition of collective rights and of a range of economic, social and cultural
rights.25 But in developing authoritative interpretations of these rights, some
international jurisprudence has been reluctant to confront distributive issues
or interrogate the foundations of economic ordering.26
It is also the case that, when international human rights bodies have issued
judgments or declarations, these instruments have often failed to deliver
hoped-for results, partly owing to the limited effectiveness of international
enforcement mechanisms in the face of determined state non-compliance.
Empirical research shows that many human rights decisions have not been
implemented, in full or in part, or the outcomes of their implementation have
fallen short of expectations.27
Further, questions of agency are a recurrent issue in human rights advocacy, as the worldviews of social actors and their (often highly trained, urbanbased) legal advisors may not fully align, even more so when substantial geographical and cultural distances are at play, and as differentiated access to
understanding and to action in the context of international legal proceedings

24

Id.
Margot E. Salomon, Why Should It Matter That Others Have More? Poverty, Inequality, and the Potential of International Human Rights Law, 37 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 2137,
2155 (2011) (“Its tenets hold the possibility for an interpretation that better accommodates
this collective venture of distributive justice; there is nothing inherent in its theoretical
underpinnings on the nature of rights or obligations that limit the human rights project to
sanctioning merely the bare bones of what it means to be human”).
26
Id. at 2137–55.
27
OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE, STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
LAND RIGHTS (2017), https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/8c45f0be-d3be-40d6-aae8
-a0b046bf6511/slip-land-rights-20170620.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC LITIGATION
IMPACTS]; Joel E. Correia, Adjudication and Its Aftereffects in Three Inter-American Court
Cases Brought Against Paraguay: Indigenous Land Rights, 11 ERASMUS L. REV. 43, 43–
56 (2018).
25
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can raise difficult challenges in ensuring the agenda genuinely proceeds from
the bottom up.28
C. Human Rights in 3D
These considerations confirm the relevance of critically interrogating the
viability of human rights concepts and practices, and of international human
rights law, in transforming socio-economic relations. At the same time, recourse to human rights in diverse social justice struggles raises questions
about whether parts of the critique do not in fact rest on a reductionist view of
human rights and downplay their evolving and contested nature.29 Beyond the
apparent “common language of humanity” human rights have been claimed
to provide,30 the human rights field involves radically different actors and arenas—from global law firms advising large corporations on business and human rights due diligence, to international agencies and the multilateral architecture of human rights diplomacy, through to grassroots lawyers working
with disadvantaged people in often challenging and even dangerous environments.
In this context, diverse human rights actors—from social activists to legal
technocrats—have advanced different and possibly conflicting human rights
conceptions and practices. While some advocates have espoused both human
rights and neoliberal positions,31 and while human rights have been enlisted
to support neoliberal reform,32 attempts to “hijack” human rights did not go
unchallenged,33 and some radical scholars have reconceptualised human

28
See, e.g., Deval Desai, A Qui l’Homme Sauvage? The Text, Context, and Subtext of
Agreements Between Mining Corporations and Indigenous Communities, in SOCIO-LEGAL
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: TEXT, CONTEXT, SUBTEXT 153–56
(Amanda Perry-Kessaris ed., 2013).
29
See Julia Dehm, Rights as Potential Sites of Distributive Struggle, TOQUEVILLE21
(July 10, 2018), https://tocqueville21.com/focus/rights-as-potential-sites-of-distributive-st
ruggle/ (discussing the contested nature of human rights).
30
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights: The Common Language of Humanity, Statement at the Opening of the World Conference on Human Rights
(June 14, 1993), in WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS 5–21 (Digumarti Bhaskara
Rao ed., 2003).
31
See, e.g., Whyte, supra note 17.
32
See, e.g., SLOBODIAN, supra note 17, at 134–42; Joseph Slaughter, Hijacking Human
Rights: Neoliberalism, the New Historiography, and the End of the Third World, 40 HUM.
RTS. Q. 735, 737–75 (2018).
33
Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law:
A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 815, 815–44 (2002); see also Andrew T. Lang,
Re-Thinking Trade and Human Rights, BEPRESS LEGAL REPOSITORY (2006), https://law.be
press.com/expresso/eps/1685 (discussing generally the relationship between human rights
and trade law).
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rights as an “ideology of struggle”34 that places human rights directly on a
collision course with prevailing economic structures.
Scholars from the global South have been particularly attentive to this diversity of human rights modes, distinguishing human rights as a technique of
global governance from human rights as an “insurrectionary praxis” that, in
giving voice to human suffering, destabilises and at times disrupts political
and economic power,35 and have called for a “structural approach” to human
rights that would fundamentally question international economic ordering.36
Partly as a result of the interplay between diverse human rights conceptions,
the past two decades have witnessed significant evolutions in discursive and
jurisprudential human rights practices, which are not always fully reflected in
critical analyses grounded in the historical origins or ideational matrices of
human rights.
In this evolving kaleidoscope of human rights forms, the penetration of
hegemonic discourses into the fabric of human rights can coexist with human
rights advocacy that challenges fundamental parameters of economic ordering. Far from “[making themselves] at home in a plutocratic world,”37 more
radical activists have mobilized human rights to renegotiate socioeconomic
relations. Examples include human rights organizations and alliances such as
FIAN International and ESCR-Net,38 but also organizations that do not primarily frame their institutional mandates in human rights terms, such as international agrarian movement La Via Campesina.39
The public gaze has often focused on international NGOs based in Europe
and North America, and on the institutions of multilateral diplomacy. However, a richer tapestry of human rights concepts and strategies emerges once
fuller consideration is given to the ways in which social movements, including
in the global South, have harnessed human rights to sustain their struggles.
This includes not only confrontational strategies such as campaigning and litigation, but also approaches based on dialogue and engagement, sometimes in
spaces opened by the more adversarial action.40
34

ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 3 (1989).
UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10–22 (2008).
36
See Julia Dehm, Highlighting Inequalities in the Histories of Human Rights: Contestations over Justice, Needs and Rights in the 1970s, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 871, 871–95
(2018).
37
Samuel Moyn, How the Human Rights Movement Failed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/23/opinion/human-rights-movement-failed.html.
38
See generally FIAN INT’L, https://www.fian.org/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2020); ESCRNET, https://www.escr-net.org/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
39
The International Peasant’s Voice, LA VIA CAMPESINA, https://viacampesina/org/en/i
nterantional-peasants-voice/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
40
For an example of rights harnessing in a dialogue process, see Samuel Nguiffo, Victor
Amougou Amougou, Brendan Schwartz & Lorenzo Cotula, Indigenous Peoples’ Land
Rights in Cameroon: Progress to Date and Possible Futures, INT’L INST. ENV’T & DEV.
(2017), http://pubs.iied.org/17448IIED/.
35
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As political space shrinks in many places, activists have paid a high price
for pursuing social justice goals through human rights. In 2017 alone, 209
human rights activists defending land, environmental and indigenous peoples’
rights, particularly in the context of extractive industry and mega projects,
were reportedly murdered, with many more reported to have suffered attacks,
harassment, and intimidation.41
Overall, these circumstances question the appropriateness of interrogating
the relation between human rights and social justice in the light of a single
“human rights project.” This single project would also encompass, for example, neoliberals reading human rights as coextensive with a business-friendly
climate, and hegemonic states justifying military intervention in the name of
actual or perceived rights violations.42 Rather, the contested nature of human
rights calls for fully considering the plurality of human rights theories and
approaches, the internal tensions and contradictions, and the ways in which
both concepts and practices are subject to contestation and evolution over
time.
D. Social Movements and Human Rights: “Reactive” and “Constitutive”
Strategies
The processes by which activists mobilize human rights to advance social
justice are complex and manifold. There are several possible ways to classify
these processes, and the boundaries of such classifications are typically
blurred. One set of divides concerns the place of rights-claiming in advocacy
strategies. In what can broadly be referred to as “reactive” modes, social actors have harnessed existing human rights norms and institutions to challenge
specific instances or patterns of social injustice. While in “constitutive”
modes, they have sought to shift the contours of human rights themselves, by
advocating for the recognition of new rights or the reconfiguration of existing
ones.
On one level, reactive and constitutive modes seem to correlate to traditional conceptions of the separation of powers. Access to justice can feature
prominently in reactive strategies. As a result, judges can play a prominent
41

FRONT LINE DEFS., ANNUAL REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS AT RISK IN 2017
(2017), https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/annual_report_digital.pdf;
see also At What Cost? Irresponsible Business and the Murder of Land and Environment
Defenders in 2017, GLOB. WITNESS (July 24, 2018), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/cam
paigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost/; Special Rapporteur on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Rep. of Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/39/17 (Aug. 10, 2018).
42
See generally ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003) (e.g., observing the increasingly hegemonic nature of humanitarian interventions towards the end of the twentieth
century).
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role both in providing redress to the petitioners and in advancing “progressive” interpretations of the law that can have repercussions beyond the dispute
at stake. On the other hand, the foundational dimensions of constitutive strategies would more closely resonate with the role of legislatures in processes of
legal change—or, in an international context, with the role of states and international organizations in their treaty making or law development capacity.
However, this apparent correlation is partial if not ultimately misleading,
not least because rights-claiming is not confined to formal legal proceedings,
whether judicial or legislative, and can instead be primarily located in social
and discursive practices that are centred on collective action, public advocacy
and social mobilization.43 In addition, border lines between reactive and constitutive modes are often blurred in practice, and the two modes can substantially overlap in real-life social struggles, which often mobilize elements of
both, whether simultaneously or sequentially.
That said, taken in their archetypical forms, the two modes represent distinctive approaches to the relation between human rights and social justice.
The former possibly reflects a pragmatic, instrumentalist activation of human
rights to challenge certain abuses; the latter embodies a more normative approach aimed at shifting the legal and ideational foundations of political and
economic ordering. Examining the relation between human rights and social
justice struggles through the prism of the two modes can add granularity, and
possibly analytical clarity, to ongoing debates about the place of human rights
in emancipatory strategies.
What follows is a closer examination of the human rights and social justice
interface considered in its reactive and constitutive modes, drawing on experiences of indigenous and agrarian movements mobilizing human rights in
their struggles over land, resources and territories.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN “REACTIVE” MODE: THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE
PROPERTY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND STRUGGLES
A. Introductory Remarks
In what this study refers to as reactive strategies, social actors invoke human rights to challenge specific instances or patterns of unjust socio-

43
Arzey & McNamara, supra note 7, at 743 (noting the practice of invoking human
rights law in political advocacy).

486

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:473

economic relations—from land grabbing44 to labor exploitation.45 Where advocacy mobilizes human rights that are formally recognized in applicable positive law, as it may be necessary to do in the context of international human
rights litigation, activists may have to rely on concepts that are implicated
with prevailing political and economic ordering, or otherwise not fully aligned
with the social justice goals pursued, but that can be instrumental to pragmatically advancing the cause. In addition, the emphasis on challenging egregious
violations may be vulnerable, at least at first sight, to the critique that human
rights can merely “humanize” socio-economic relations without fundamentally transforming them.46
However, advocacy in reactive modes often confronts distributive issues,
for example concerning control over land and natural resources, with potentially far-reaching implications for decision-making processes and for policy
choices over development models and socio-political organization. Reactive
advocacy also situates human rights as an evolving, contested space, with the
normative content of rights being the outcome of struggle between different
legal interpretations, and between different visions of society. The resulting
reframing of issues and rights can sustain public advocacy well beyond the
dispute directly at stake, blurring divides between reactive and constitutive
modes.
Take the right to property, a quintessentially liberal human right that has
traditionally been associated with providing a foundation for the capitalist
economy, with resisting redistribution, and with promoting a vision of development based on individual ownership and so-called free markets.47 In many
resource-dependent countries the intensification of natural resource extraction, as part of an “extractivist” development model that places the commodification and exploitation of natural resources at the centre of economic
growth strategies,48 has fostered widespread concerns about social and
44
See, e.g., FIAN INT’L, LAND GRABBING IN KENYA AND MOZAMBIQUE: A REPORT ON
TWO RESEARCH MISSIONS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF LAND GRABBING (2010), htt
ps://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2015/2010_4_Landgrabbing_Kenya_M
ozambique_e.pdf.
45
See, e.g., Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most: Workers’ Rights in Bangladesh’s Garment Factories, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/r
eport/2015/04/22/whoever-raises-their-head-suffers-most/workers-rights-bangladeshs-gar
ment#91c5bc; “Work Faster or Get Out”: Labor Rights Abuses in Cambodia’s Garment
Industry, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/11
work-faster-or-get-out/labor-rights-abuses-cambodias-garment-industry.
46
Umut Özsu, Grabbing Land Legally: A Marxist Analysis, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 215,
215–33 (2019).
47
See generally FRANK K. UPHAM, THE GREAT PROPERTY FALLACY: THEORY, REALITY,
AND GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2018) (deconstructing the perceived necessity
of westernized property rights to economic development).
48
Linda Farthing & Nicole Fabricant, Introduction: Open Veins Revisited – Charting
the Economic, Social, and Political Contours of the New Extractivism in Latin America,
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environmental impacts, the dispossession of rural people, and structural imbalances in the legal frameworks that underpin resource extraction.49
These processes have been associated with hotly contested debates about
desirable development pathways; with complex local-to-global political economies that tend to place the apparatus of the state at the service of extractivism; and with diverse strategies of co-option, co-operation or resistance on the
part of indigenous peoples affected by commercial operations.50
In the context of often tense socio-political confrontations, resistance strategies mobilizing international human rights law have driven the emergence of
new jurisprudential dimensions of the right to property: in a string of cases
before regional human rights institutions in Africa and the Americas, indigenous peoples have invoked this right in order to resist natural resource extraction on their ancestral lands, and to advance a relation between humans and

45 LATIN AM. PERSP. 4, 4–17 (2018); Lorenzo Pellegrini, Imagineries of Development
Through Extraction: The ‘History of Bolivian Petroleum’ and the Present Value of the
Future, GEOFORUM 130, 130–41 (2018); Maristella Svampa, Commodities Consensus: Neoextractivism and Enclosure of the Commons in Latin America, 114 S. ATLANTIC Q. 65,
65–82 (2015).
49
For a more detailed review, see LORENZO COTULA, ‘Land Grabbing’ and International Investment Law: Toward a Global Reconfiguration of Property?, in YEARBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2014–2015 177 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed.,
2015). See generally Saturnino M. Borras Jr. & Jennifer Franco, From Threat to Opportunity? Problems with the Idea of a “Code of Conduct” for Land-Grabbing, 13 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 507 (2010); KAITLIN Y. CORDES, LISE JOHNSON & SAM SZOKE-BURLE,
LAND DEAL DILEMMAS: GRIEVANCES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INVESTOR PROTECTIONS
(2016), https://doi.org/10.7916/D8513ZFG; LORENZO COTULA, HUMAN RIGHTS, NATURAL
RESOURCE AND INVESTMENT LAW IN A GLOBALISED WORLD: SHADES OF GREY IN THE
SHADOW OF THE LAW (2012); DARIA DAVITTI, INVESTMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED
CONFLICT: CHARTING AN ELUSIVE INTERSECTION (2019); NATURAL RESOURCES GRABBING:
AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE (Francesca Romanin Jacur, Angelica Bonfanti, &
Francesco Seatzu eds., 2015); Cotula, supra note 8; Ӧzsu, supra note 46; Surabhi Ranganathan, Ocean Floor Grab: International Law and the Making of an Extractive Imaginary,
30 EUR. J. INT’L L. 573 (2019); Philip Seufert, The FAO Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, 10 GLOBALIZATIONS 181
(2013); Nina Tzouvala, A False Promise? Regulating Land-Grabbing and the Post-Colonial State, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 235 (2019). For a more general reflection, see also Julia
Dehm, Review Essay, 19 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 763 (2019) (reviewing THE MISERY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONFRONTATION WITH INJUSTICE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (John
Linarelli, Margot Salomon & Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah eds., 2018).
50
Penelope Anthias, Indigenous Peoples and the New Extraction: From Territorial
Rights to Hydrocarbon Citizenship in the Bolivian Chaco, 45 LATIN AM. PERSP. 136, 143
(2018) (noting the options the Guaraní people faced when confronted with encroaching
hydrocarbon claims); Ruth Hall, Marc Edelman, Saturnino M. Borras, Ian Scoones, Ben
White & Wendy Wolford, Resistance, Acquiescence or Incorporation? An Introduction to
Land Grabbing and Political Reactions ‘From Below’, 42 J. PEASANT STUD. 467, 483
(2015) (observing “a spectrum of reactions to land deals which extend far beyond resistance per se”).
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their surrounding environment that is founded on the collective and sociocultural dimensions of lands and resources.51
These developments raise intriguing questions as to whether and how a
right that is arguably so closely associated with the “status quo” can be fruitfully appropriated and reconfigured in social justice claims. In fact, the apparent gap between the logic of emancipatory struggles and the mainstream framing of the right to property makes judicial recourse to this right an
instrumentalist, reactive strategy par excellence, and a useful testing ground
for critically interrogating the place of these strategies in social justice struggles.
B. Mapping the Terrain
Use of human rights discourses in land struggles is a socially diffuse phenomenon the bounds of which are difficult to delineate with precision. On the
other hand, indigenous peoples’ reliance on the right to property in international human rights proceedings aimed at challenging extractivist development models has primarily developed in some fifteen cases taken to the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court),52 and to a lesser
extent to Africa’s continental human rights institutions, namely the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission)53 and the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court).54

51

See cases cited infra note 52.
Kaliña v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 309, ¶ 61 (Nov. 25, 2015); Garífuna Triunfo de la Cruz Cmty. v. Honduras,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 305, ¶ 204 (Oct.
8, 2015); Kuna Indigenous People of Madungandí v. Panama, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 284 (Oct. 14, 2014); Operation Genesis
v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
270 (Nov. 20, 2013); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012); Saramaka
People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007); Sawhoyamaxa Indiegenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye
Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005); Moiwana Cmty. v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 (June 15, 2005); Mayagna
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).
53
Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr.
Ct. H.P.R. (May 26, 2017).
54
Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No.
276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.] (Nov.
2009); see also Giovanna Gismondi, Denial of Justice: The Latest Indigenous Land Disputes Before the European Court of Human Rights and the Need for an Expansive
52
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The cases present extremely diverse factual fabrics and legal arguments,
and advocacy objectives also differed considerably. Further, the place of the
right to property varied in the different cases, reflecting diversity in the underlying human rights treaties and the legal strategies pursued, with several
cases also relying on other human rights. In the lead Inter-American Court
case Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, an indigenous
community claimed that, by granting logging concessions in its ancestral
lands, the government of Nicaragua violated their right to an effective remedy,
their right to property and several other human rights recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights.55
The Inter-American Court found that, while Nicaragua’s domestic law formally recognized indigenous land rights, it did not provide effective means
for identifying and protecting indigenous lands in practice. The Court ultimately ordered the government to conduct the demarcation and collective registration of the community’s ancestral lands before proceeding with any further resource allocations that could impinge on those lands.56
A few other Inter-American Court cases also stemmed from indigenous
and tribal peoples’ resistance to large-scale petroleum, mining, forestry, or
infrastructure projects, but the emphasis was on consultation processes more
than land titling. In Saramaka People v. Suriname—a case concerning the allocation of logging and mining concessions in a tribal people’s territory—the
Court devoted considerable attention to issues of consultation and free, prior
and informed consent (FPIC).57 In finding in favor of the Saramakas, the InterAmerican Court required the government of Suriname to demarcate and title
the community’s land, but it also called for a wider range of measures to ensure consultation and FPIC, independent impact assessments, and effective
redress, among other things.58 The Inter-American Court further elaborated
on consultation requirements in the later Kichwa Indigenous People of
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, a case concerning the allocation of petroleum concessions in the Amazon.59
Yet other cases concern indigenous claims for the restitution of long-dispossessed ancestral lands now occupied by commercial ranching operations.
This includes several Inter-American Court cases—Yakye Axa Indigenous
Interpretation of Protocol 1, 18 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2016) (discussing relevant
jurisprudence in Europe).
55
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
56
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 173 (Aug. 31, 2001).
57
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 125–37 (Nov. 28, 2007).
58
Id. at 214.
59
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 124–232 (June 27, 2012).
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Community v. Paraguay, Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,
and Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay—initiated by indigenous peoples in the Paraguayan Chaco, who were dispossessed of their ancestral lands from the late 19th century. These judgments place greater emphasis
on investigating the continuing relationship between the indigenous peoples
and their lands, and the relevance of the right to collective property as a normative foundation for land restitution.60
Some of the right-to-property cases argued before the African Commission
and the African Court also concern situations of historical or ongoing evictions and land dispossessions, though in these cases recourse to the right to
property tends to feature within a much wider range of rights recognized by
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, including non-discrimination, the right to life, the right to freedom of conscience, the right to education and cultural life, peoples’ right to freely dispose of their natural resources
and the right to development.61 Conservationist arguments were also a feature
of some of the African Commission and African Court cases, with governments claiming that the eviction of indigenous peoples from their ancestral
lands was necessary to preserve fragile ecosystems.62
Beyond the important differences in the factual circumstances and the legal arguments that characterised each dispute, as a broad generalisation the
cases’ social justice claims variously combined elements of distribution (insofar as they concerned ownership or control of land and natural resources),
recognition (because in seeking respect for cultural difference, the legal
claims often challenged cultural domination and assimilationist logics), and
representation (seeking to transform patterns of voice in decision making).63
While litigation was typically confined to demands concerning a specific
people or territory, these social justice claims often sought to challenge the
legal arrangements associated with the prevailing extractivist model, and ultimately the political economy of vested interests and socio-political relations
that underpins that model. This was the case whether the claims sought to
reconfigure control of natural resources in the face of the expanding petroleum
or mining frontier, or claim restitution of lands now used to sustain a major
pillar of the national economy. For these reasons, several legal cases were

60
See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 126–41 (Mar. 29, 2006).
61
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 2, 4, 8, 14, 17, 21, 22, June 27,
1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; see also Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v.
Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr. Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 130 (May 26, 2017).
62
Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr.
Ct. H.P.R., ¶ 130 (May 26, 2017).
63
FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 11, at 380.
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embedded in highly politicized disputes, and litigation often formed part of
wider strategies of socio-political mobilization.64
The central role of indigenous and tribal peoples in advancing the claims
requires further elaboration. In the Americas, that role correlates with a significant number of ratifications of the International Labour Organization’s
(ILO) Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries;65 with broad-based formal support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP);66 and, in
some jurisdictions, with the existence of national legislation that establishes
tailored safeguards for indigenous peoples.67
In contrast with these formal commitments to indigenous peoples’ rights,
and sometimes with a political rhetoric that emphasises ethnic diversity and
respect for minorities, the region has also experienced recurring conflicts between indigenous movements on the one hand and extractivist interests that
link the state apparatus to domestic and international businesses on the other,
within an overarching political economy that tends to hollow out applicable
legal safeguards from within and to favor the expansion of natural resource
extraction.68
In these contexts, resource conflicts are relatively frequent, including violent conflicts with tragic outcomes, and the adoption of “progressive” legal
texts has at times been a way for authorities to (be seen to) address the political
imperative to respond to the tensions, without however fundamentally

64
For an example concerning the Inter-American Court Sawhoyamaxa case, see Julia
Cabello Alonso, Sawhoyamaxa and the Path Towards Dignity, 9 RIGHT TO FOOD J. 13
(2014), https://www.fian.org/fileadmin/media/publications_2015/Right_to_Food_Journal
_021214.pdf (writing about land occupation following delays in the implementation of the
Inter-American Court judgment).
65
Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries, June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). Fifteen of
the twenty-two states that have ratified the convention are from Latin America.
66
G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]; see also JESSE HOHMANN & MARC WELLER, THE
U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: A COMMENTARY (2018);
Jérémie Gilbert & Corinne Lennox, Towards New Development Paradigms: The United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a Tool to Support Self-Determined Development, 23 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 104 (2019).
67
See, e.g., Law Decree No. 29785 [Ley del derecho a consulta previa a los pueblos
indígenas u originários, reconocido en el convenio 169 de la organización internacional del
trabajo (OIT)] Sept. 7, 2011 (Peru). For a critique, see Roger Merino Acuña, Coloniality
and Indigenous Territorial Rights in the Peruvian Amazon: A Critique of the Prior Consultation, CTR. FOR DEV. STUDIES, UNIV. OF BATH (2015), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstrea
m/10419/128133/1/bpd38.pdf.
68
Armando Guevara Gil & Carla Cabanillas Linares, Mineralizing the Right to Prior
Consultation: From Recognition to Disregard of Indigenous and Peasant Rights in Peru,
GLOB. JURIST 1 (2019).
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changing the development model that created those tensions in the first
place.69 More generally, formal commitments to the international instruments
that protect indigenous peoples’ rights coexist with widespread lack of awareness about legal texts and rights, including among government officials, resulting in highly uneven patterns of penetration of international instruments
into national and subnational administrative practices.70
In Africa, questions of indigeneity have often involved gaps between anthropological conceptions, political positions and international norms. Because most of the population is of African descent, several governments have
questioned the relevance of notions of indigeneity, thereby rejecting the very
premises on which the international protection of indigenous peoples’ rights
is founded.71 However, recent years have witnessed growing appropriation of
indigenous peoples language by marginalized groups such as forest dwellers
and pastoralists, including via litigation before national courts.72
The African Commission and the African Court have applied the concept
of indigenous peoples to marginalized minority groups having a strong cultural relationship with land and resources.73 In a case concerning the Ogiek of
Kenya, for example, the African Court noted the deep relationship that the
Ogiek had with their traditional land and resources, the Ogiek’s cultural distinctiveness, and their continued marginalization. It concluded that the Ogiek
are “an indigenous population . . . having a particular status and deserving
special protection.”74 This jurisprudential orientation follows the approach developed over the years by the African Commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities.75

69

Id.
Benedict Kingsbury, Indigenous Peoples, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).
71
AFR. COMM’N ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS & INT’L WORKING GRP. FOR
INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS, EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, LAND RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS’/COMMUNITIES’ RIGHTS 24 (2017). See Jérémie Gilbert, Litigating Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Africa: Potential, Challenges and Limitations, 66 INT’L & COMP.
L. Q. 657, 658 (showing that the Central African Republic is the only African state to have
ratified ILO Convention No. 169. African states have also been reluctant to adopt constitutional or legislative provisions on indigenous peoples, but some have recently done so).
72
Gilbert, supra note 71. For an anthropological perspective, see Micaela Pelican &
Junko Maruyama, The Indigenous Rights Movement in Africa: Perspectives from Botswana and Cameroon, 36(1) AFR. STUDY MONOGRAPHS 49 (2015) (showing an anthropological perspective).
73
Gilbert, supra note 71, at 658–59.
74
Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Kenya, No. 006/2012, Decision, Afr.
Ct. H.P.R., ¶¶ 105–112 (May 26, 2017).
75
Afr. Comm’n on Human and People’s Rights, Rep. of the Afr. Comm’n’s Working
Group on Indigenous Populations/Cmtys., OC/OS(XXXIV)/345 (May 14, 2003), avaialable at https://www.achpr.org/public/Document/file/Any/expert_report_on_indigenous_c
70
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Further complexities must be acknowledged in discussing actors and issues of agency, not least because social realities do not always neatly fit legal
categories: social identities may present fluid boundaries and evolve over
time; indigeneity may only be one register among several that a group may
use in advocacy strategies; and “communities” may present significant social
differentiation and divided opinion. The relationship between indigenous peoples and their legal advisors would also deserve closer exploration: public interest lawyers may advance their own strategies,76 and practitioners recognize
that deliberate arrangements are needed to ensure that those whose rights are
at stake are in the driving seat—from framing public campaigns to conducting
human rights litigation.77
C. Normative (Re)configurations
In a sense, indigenous peoples’ recourse to the internationally recognized
human right to property is remarkable given the ways in which international
law concepts were historically deployed to marginalize indigenous peoples;78
how colonial powers deployed Lockean notions of property to legitimize their
appropriation of indigenous lands;79 and the gulf between property concepts
and indigenous ideas.80 While property presupposes a clear “separation between the owner and the owned,” and a commodity (a “thing”) that forms the
object of the property relations, many indigenous systems emphasise the allencompassing inter-penetration between people and the environment
ommunities.pdf; see also Paul Tamuno, New Human Rights Concept for Old African Problems: An Analysis of the Challenges of Introducing and Implementing Indigenous Rights
in Africa, 61 J. AFR. L. 305 (2017).
76
See, e.g., Peter Brett, Cause Lawyers sans Frontières: Juristes Sud-Africains et Judiciarisation du Politique en Afrique Australe [Cause Lawyers Beyond Borders: The South
African Legal Profession and Regional Judicialization], 138 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE [AFR.
POL.] 93 (Raphaël Botiveau trans., 2015) (discussing the spread of public litigation approaches, including indigenous peoples’ claims, from the United States to South Africa
and its neighboring countries, as well as the political processes influencing South African
lawyers’ involvement with national, regional, and transnational litigation).
77
See, e.g., MAXIMILIANO MENDIETA MIRANDA & JULIA CABELLO ALONSO, ADVANCING
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS THROUGH REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF
PARAGUAY (2017), https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17602IIED.pdf (discussing the authors’ role
in supporting five indigenous rights cases at the Inter-American human rights system); see
also TOM LOMAX, ASSERTING COMMUNITY LAND RIGHTS USING RSPO COMPLAINT
PROCEDURES IN INDONESIA AND LIBERIA (2015), https://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12584IIED.pdf.
78
See generally ANTHONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
79
AFR. COMM’N WORKING GRP. ON INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS/CMTY., supra note 71, at
31–32.
80
Stuart Kirsch, Juridification of Indigenous Politics, in LAW AGAINST THE STATE:
ETHNOGRAPHIC FORAYS INTO LAW’S TRANSFORMATIONS 23, 39 (Julia Eckert et al. eds.,
2012).
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surrounding them, reflected in the intimate connection between land, traditional ways of life and systems of belief.81 And while Western conceptions of
property have often identified in the right to sell a key attribute of property,
many indigenous systems frame land as inalienable collective heritage.
It was the explicit affirmation of the right to property in regional human
rights treaties that, from a pragmatic viewpoint, made this right a relevant normative reference for indigenous peoples’ strategies to protect their claims to
land and resources.82 Recourse to international law partly responded to perceived shortcomings of arrangements for contesting decision making in national legal and political arenas: legal activists have talked of the “structural
discrimination” that indigenous peoples experience in some national legal systems—owing to legal categories that are not aligned with indigenous peoples’
conceptions, to the non-recognition of indigenous peoples’ claims, and/or to
a general policy thrust that favors commercial interests.83 The exhaustion of
domestic remedies requirements commonly included in human rights treaties
inherently frame recourse to international redress as a last resort.84
In mobilizing the internationally recognized human right to property, indigenous peoples translated indigenous concepts into property terms. But they
also sought to reconfigure the right to property as a vehicle for reclaiming
control of strategic resources and articulating a more complex relation between people and territory, whereby land and resources are interrelated with
history, culture, way of life and sense of belonging, and with political and
economic agency via free, prior and informed consent.85 In addressing these
claims, regional human rights institutions have drawn extensively on international instruments concerning indigenous peoples’ rights, particularly ILO
Convention No. 169 and the UNDRIP.86 This has promoted cross-fertilisation
81

PIERRE-ETIENNE KENFACK, SAMUEL NGUIFFO & TÉODYL NKUINTCHUA, LAND
INVESTMENTS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE LAW: LESSONS FROM CAMEROON 9 (Int’l Inst. for
Env’t & Dev., 2016); see also James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in
Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of
What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have in Lands and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 7, 7 (2005); Kirsch, supra note 80, at 34.
82
See Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 21,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights art. 14, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
83
MIRANDA & ALONSO, supra note 77, at 1.
84
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
46(1)(a), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights art. 50, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217.
85
See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 28, 2007); Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex
rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No. 276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum.
and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶ 226–28 (Nov. 2009).
86
See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶117, 119 (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
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between generally applicable human rights concepts and international norms
tailored to the specific circumstances of indigenous peoples.
The fragmentation of the international human rights regime, including geographically into different regional systems, makes it impossible to draw general conclusions about the contours of the right to property that are not contingent on relevant contextual and normative parameters.87 However, the
resulting jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court, and to some extent of its
African counterparts, does provide pointers for understanding the legal configuration of the right to property in relation to indigenous land claims. Two
points deserve particular attention: one concerning the scope of the right to
property, the other the arrangements for its protection under international law.
First, international human rights jurisprudence has broadened the relevance of the right to property to a wide range of tenure configurations. While
the liberal tradition tended to anchor the right to property to protecting individual ownership over assets often conceived of in monetary terms, it is now
clear that regional human rights instruments protect diverse sets of rights, including collective rights founded on indigenous tenure systems and not formally recognized as ownership under domestic law, and that they recognize
the social, cultural and spiritual dimensions of land and natural resources.
This orientation was already apparent in the early Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua judgment, in which the Inter-American Court
held that the right to property has an “autonomous meaning” under international law, which “cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them
in domestic law”; that this right protects collective rights held under customary law, even in the absence of officially recognized title deeds; and that “the
close ties of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival.”88
Subsequent jurisprudence has further elaborated on these notions, for example extending protection to the collective claims of tribal peoples based on
“their longstanding use and occupation of the land and resources necessary
for their physical and cultural survival,” irrespective of clearly established
(ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 92–93 (Nov. 28, 2007); Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v.
Ecuador, Merits, and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 70,
161, 163–64, 176, 201, 215 (June 27, 2012); Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights
v. Republic of Kenya, No. 006/2012, Judgement, Afr. Court on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts.
[Afr. Ct. H.P.R.], ¶¶ 126–28 (May 26, 2017).
87
Lorenzo Cotula, Property in a Shrinking Planet: Fault Lines in International Human
Rights and Investment Law, 11 INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT 113, 129 (2015).
88
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 146–151 (Aug. 31, 2001); see also Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 120–21 (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty.
v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125,
¶ 131 (June 17, 2005).
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customary law claims;89 and even to situations where an indigenous people
has unwillingly long been deprived of the physical possession of the land but
has maintained strong cultural and spiritual ties to it, in which case the right
to collective property may provide the basis for land restitution claims.90
Second, regional human rights jurisprudence has reconfigured the mechanisms for the legal protection of the right to property. In the liberal tradition,
these are usually centered on legal safeguards against expropriation, and possibly regulatory interferences, including compensation, non-discrimination,
public purpose and/or due process. These conceptions are broadly reflected in
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has highlighted the need for authorities to strike a fair balance between public and
private interests including through appropriate procedural and compensatory
safeguards.91
On the other hand, in cases concerning commercial or development projects in ancestral territories, regional human rights institutions have placed
considerable emphasis on connecting the right to collective property to consultation and consent processes. In Saramaka People v. Suriname, the InterAmerican Court noted that, while states can ultimately compress tribal peoples’ right to collective property, they can only do so if certain conditions are
met. These conditions were held to include the “effective participation” of the
tribal people in decisions concerning developments on their lands; a “reasonable benefit” for the tribal people from any such developments; and a prior
and independent environmental and social impact assessment.92 The Court
further clarified that, in the case of large-scale projects having major impacts,
“effective participation” requires the state “not only to consult with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to
their customs and traditions.”93
The more recent Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador judgment referred in more general terms to a “right to consultation,” rather than
specifically to free, prior and informed consent, though it also clarified that
the consultation must be in good faith and “with the aim of reaching an agreement or obtaining consent.”94 African human rights institutions have
89

See, e.g., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 96 (Nov. 28, 2007).
90
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 128 (Mar. 29, 2006).
91
See James and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8793/79, 8 Eur. H. R. Rep. 123,
¶ 50 (1986); Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9006/80, 8 Eur. H. R. Rep.
329, ¶ 120 (1986).
92
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 129 (Nov. 28, 2007).
93
Id. at ¶¶ 134, 137.
94
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 160, 163–67, 185 (June 27, 2012).
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developed broadly comparable approaches to configuring the protection of the
right to property in relation to indigenous peoples, including by explicitly
cross-referencing the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court.95
While this jurisprudence leaves the boundaries of consultation and consent
indeterminate, the approach goes beyond the traditional liberal framing of the
right to property, moving away from primarily negative safeguards aimed at
protecting rights holders against arbitrary or discriminatory conduct, toward a
greater emphasis on voice in decision making and control over processes of
change. This orientation resonates with some of the ways indigenous peoples
themselves have framed their claims to land and resources, particularly the
importance they have traditionally attached—in both legal and discursive
practices—to prior consultation and consent as vehicles for exercising their
right to self-determination.96
D. Preliminary Appraisal
The international jurisprudence on the right to collective property situates
human rights as a contested space, casting the normative content as the product of contestation between different interpretations of human rights norms,
and—at a deeper level—between different conceptions of property and ultimately different visions of society. The activation of the right to property in
emancipatory struggles also raises some difficult questions about the interface
between human rights and social justice.
A first set of questions exposes the conceptual and concrete limitations of
the approach, in both jurisprudential and practical terms. Arguably, even a
reconfigured right to collective property can translate into outcomes that are
coextensive with resource extraction and commodification. Regional human
rights institutions have recognized that the protection of “the right to property
. . . is not absolute,” and that under certain circumstances the state can lawfully restrict that right.97 Commercial projects that undermine indigenous livelihoods and ways of life could still go ahead if certain conditions are complied

95
Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No.
276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶
226–28 (Nov. 2009); see also Elisa Morgera, Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing at the
Cross-Roads of the Human Right to Science and International Biodiversity Law, 4 LAWS
803 (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/4/4/803; Elisa Morgera, The Need
for an International Legal Concept of Fair and Equitable Benefit-Sharing, 27 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 353 (2016).
96
See Jennifer N. Costanza, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Prior Consultation: Transforming Human Rights from the Grassroots in Guatemala, 14 HUM. RTS. J. 260 (2015)
(providing an anthropological study of indigenous peoples claiming the “right of prior consultation” through local referenda on proposed extractive industry products in Guatemala).
97
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 127 (Nov. 28, 2007).
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with, within a state-centric system that grants governments latitude in overriding traditional claims.98
In this context, FPIC is itself a hotly contested concept, with different actors (governments, businesses, indigenous movements) putting forward different interpretations that range from transformative to box-ticking;99 private
sector-driven “thin” notions of consent acquiring growing traction; and substantial power imbalances often leading to ineffectual processes that reform,
and as such legitimize, but do not fundamentally challenge, extractivism.100
Further, critical scholars have pointed to the “problematic heritage” of concepts such as consultation and consent, the ideational roots of which were
found to go back to the colonial enterprise, with enduring consequences for
the ability of those notions to underpin truly transformational agendas.101
In addition, a focus on consultation in externally driven development models could obscure more foundational rights necessary to advance a proactive
indigenous agenda.102 And while reframing indigenous claims in right to property terms can provide indigenous peoples with well-established international
protection in the face of powerful commercial interests, it can also undermine
some of the fundamental parameters of indigenous peoples’ relationship with
their surrounding environment. Indigenous tenure concepts do not necessarily
translate well into property terms, even if these terms are substantially reconfigured.
Indeed, the private law notion of property seems ill-suited as a vehicle for
territorial claims that are closely associated with collective identity, traditional
ways of life, and the exercise of the right to self-determination. At root, those
claims pertain to the realm of the political: they embody an attempt to reimagine the national social contract, and the structures of sovereignty and public
governance. Conceptual misalignments between the notions of property and
territory can have practical implications, for example in legal regimes where
the titling of property requires evidence of productive land use. This results in
legal title protections for relatively small portions of territory to the exclusion

98
Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and the
Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 162–172 (2013).
99
For a discussion of FPIC, see CATHAL DOYLE, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, TITLE TO
TERRITORY, RIGHTS AND RESOURCES: THE TRANSFORMATIVE ROLE OF FREE PRIOR AND
INFORMED CONSENT (2015).
100
James Anaya & Sergio Puig, Mitigating State Sovereignty: The Duty to Consult with
Indigenous Peoples, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 435 (2016); Nathan Yaffe, Indigenous Consent:
A Self-Determination Perspective, 19 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2018).
101
Marina Brilman, Consenting to Disposition: The Problematic Heritage and Complex
Future of Consultation and Consent of Indigenous Peoples, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
1 (2018).
102
Acuña, supra note 67, at 12.
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of traditional hunting, gathering or fishing grounds, of sacred sites, and of land
reserves set aside for future generations.103
Further, the emphasis regional human rights institutions have placed on
the demarcation and titling of indigenous peoples’ lands, including as a form
of reparation in the face of commercial encroachments, could be at odds with
traditional systems that often envisage inherently more fluid conceptions of
space and territory, and even of communities themselves. Some passages cited
in the international jurisprudence resonate with common topoi of the literature
that, often starting from liberal premises, makes the economic case for land
titling as a pathway to tenure security conceived of in eminently Western
terms.104
To be sure, there are diverse approaches to land demarcation and registration. While some reflect productivist concerns about individual ownership,
incentives to invest, access to credit, and ultimately increased production,105
others are primarily framed in collective terms, and motivated by concerns
about promoting endogenous development strategies and protecting collective
lands from dispossession by powerful political and economic actors.106
103

Id. at 13.
For example, in Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingi Cmty v. Nicaragua, the Inter-American
Court stated: “the Court notes that the limits of the territory on which that property right
exists have not been effectively delimited and demarcated by the State. This situation has
created a climate of constant uncertainty among the members of the Awas Tingni Community, insofar as they do not know for certain how far their communal property extends
geographically and, therefore, they do not know until where they can freely use and enjoy
their respective property.” Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 31, 2001). By way of comparison, a recent
World Bank blog argued that “rural communities need secure rights, clear boundaries, and
accessible land services for economic growth,” and “[a]uthorities need accurate spatial information to plan roads, public services, and infrastructure, while creating jobs.” See Why
Secure Land Rights Matter, WORLD BANK ( Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en
/news/feature/2017/03/24/why-secure-land-rights-matter (also noting that a World Bankfinanced project supported the demarcation and registration of the land of the Awas Tingni,
the indigenous community that initiated the Mayagna case).
105
Unlike the Inter-American Court’s indigenous rights jurisprudence, for example,
much World Bank literature emphasizes individual rather than collective land registration,
and frames issues in primarily productivist terms. “Secure individual property rights to land
would therefore not only increase the beneficiaries’ incentives and provide collateral for
further investment but, if all markets were competitive, would automatically lead to socially and economically desirable land market transactions.” See Klaus Deininger & Hans
Binswanger, The Evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and
Future Challenges, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, 247, 249–50 (1999), http://document
s.worldbank.org/crated/en/614861468326135799/pdf/766330JRN0WBRO00Box374385
B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
106
For conceptual and practical illustrations of this latter set of approaches, see generally
Daniel Fitzpatrick, ‘Best Practice’ Options for the Legal Recognition of Customary Tenure, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 449, 472; Rachael Knight, Jaron Vogelsang & Marena Brinkhurst,
Community Land Protection: Facilitators Guide, NAMATI 1, 5 (2016), https://namati.org/re
104
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Depending on the situation, however, border lines may be fluid, for example
where multiple objectives coexist in the same public intervention, where ambiguities affect the framing or prioritization of those objectives, or where
changes in emphasis occur over time.
The tensions inherent in the property framing may themselves create space
for these ambiguities and transitions. In their concrete historical manifestations, land demarcation and registration programs—particularly those inspired by a productivist logic—have been shown to result in complex longterm socio-economic outcomes. These often involve processes of land commodification and indirect dispossession, including through transactions under
varying economic and political pressures after the issuance of titles.107 These
circumstances call for empirical research to more rigorously assess the longterm outcomes of international human rights litigation.108
In more immediate concrete terms, there have been significant delays in
the implementation of several international rulings, and some judgments are
yet to be complied with, in full or in part.109 This mixed record of compliance
begs questions about the effectiveness of human rights strategies. A particularly fine-grained empirical picture of the politics of implementation is emerging in relation to regional human rights litigation initiated by indigenous peoples in the Paraguayan Chaco.110
As discussed, indigenous peoples in the Chaco were dispossessed of their
traditional territories from the late 19th century and were eventually employed
as laborers on cattle ranches.111 Over time, the area came to host commercial
ranching activities on a substantial scale.112 Law reforms and legal support
sources/community-land-protection-facilitators-guide/. On participatory mapping and indigenous peoples’ rights, see also Samuel Nguiffo & Robinson Djeukam, Using the Law
as a Tool to Secure the Land Rights of Indigenous Communities in Southern Cameroon, in
2008 LEGAL EMPOWERMENT IN PRACTICE: USING LEGAL TOOLS TO SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN
AFRICA 29, 43 (Lorenzo Cotula & Paul Mathieu eds., Int’l Inst. for Env’t & Dev./Food &
Agric. Org. of the U.N. 2008); Jeremie Gilbert & Ben Begbie-Clench, “Mapping for
Rights”: Indigenous Peoples, Litigation and Legal Empowerment, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 6,
6–13 (2018).
107
See, e.g., David A. Atwood, Land Registration in Africa: The Impact on Agricultural
Production, 18 WORLD DEV. 659, 663 (1990) (noting that land registration programs may
actually increase land insecurity among rural people accustomed to less formalized forms
of landholding); Kathryn Firmin-Sellers & Patrick Sellers, Expected Failures and Unexpected Successes of Land Titling in Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 1115, 1125 (1999) (“As land
becomes more valuable, farmers find themselves threatened by family members seeking to
claim private title to jointly held land, by neighbors encroaching on customarily defined
boundaries, and by businessmen and politicians seeking to claim undeveloped land.”).
108
This point benefited from a stimulating conversation with Professor Nehal Bhuta.
109
See Correia, supra note 27, at 47–52 (noting the varied levels of implementation of
rulings).
110
See Anthias, supra note 50, at 136–55
111
Correia, supra note 27, at 43.
112
Id.
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from the 1980s led the indigenous communities to initiate land restitution
claims.113 Parallel or subsequent developments saw many community members leaving the ranches and relocating to precarious settlements at the margin
of the local highway, in extremely challenging living conditions.114
After protracted and ultimately unsuccessful domestic litigation, several
communities initiated human rights proceedings at the Inter-American human
rights system.115 The proceedings resulted in favorable Inter-American Court
judgments, including land restitution orders, based on the Inter-American
Court’s finding that the petitioners had maintained a strong socio-cultural relationship with their ancestral lands, and the Court’s framing of the right to
property as protecting collective land claims considered in their socio-cultural
dimensions.116
However, these “wins” were followed by long implementation delays. Ultimately, social mobilization led to some advances in implementation, including the return of some 7,700 hectares of land to an indigenous community (out
of a total 10,700 concerned by the court case) with regards to Xákmok Kásek
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, and the allocation of alternative land in
lieu of restitution to another community, in relation to Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay.117
In Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the community
sought to break the impasse in the implementation of a land restitution judgment by (re)occupying the land.118 Mobilization led to Parliament passing legislation providing for the expropriation of the land and for its formal restitution to the community.119 However, even these successes were partial and
contingent: field-based research found the alternative land allocated to the
Yakye Axa indigenous community to be inaccessible, and the expropriation
law adopted in the Sawhoyamaxa case was not yet implemented.120 This

113

Id.
Id. at 47; see also Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 73 (Mar. 29, 2006) (explanatory).
115
MIRANDA & ALONSO, supra note 77.
116
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser.
C) No. 125 (Jun. 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006);
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010).
117
STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS, supra note 27; Correia, supra note 27, at 54–55.
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Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶¶ 11–12 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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Id. at 203, 229 (describing the legislation implemented as “acquiescence”).
120
Joel E. Correia, Indigenous Rights at a Crossroads: Territorial Struggles, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and Legal Geographies of Liminality, 97 GEOFORUM
73, 79 (2018) (“State officials have failed to fully enforce the expropriation, creating a
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situation reportedly led to the creation of inherently unstable “liminal spaces”
where de jure and de facto land control were fundamentally misaligned.121
Overall, these conceptual and practical considerations provide a cautionary tale about the effectiveness of reactive human rights strategies in sustaining social justice struggles. At the same time, nearly twenty years since the
Inter-American Court Mayagna case that first pioneered use of the right to
property to protect indigenous peoples’ lands, it is easy to take for granted the
significance of these jurisprudential developments. In having recourse to regional human rights institutions, social actors have, in effect, sought to renegotiate politically sensitive national and subnational governance spaces associated with natural resource extraction. In so doing, and despite the inherent
limitations of the property framing, and those flowing from the politics of implementation, human rights advocates have confronted difficult social justice
issues at the foundations of prevailing economic models, with the reconfigured right to collective property tending to shift control over land and territories to groups that manage resources according to systems that are not coherent with neoliberal or extractivist ordering.
The political backlashes the legal cases unleashed in several countries, particularly in Latin America, including fundamental threats to the system thinly
veiled as proposals for “reform,”122 suggest that, for all its limitations, mobilizing human rights can touch a politically sensitive nerve capable of upsetting
political and economic interests. These interests include those of the commercial actors most directly affected and their political allies, but they also relate,
in more general terms, to the ability of the state to advance a vision of development premised on the exploitation of natural resources as a mode for integrating resource-dependent countries into capitalist modes of production.
Viewed in this light, the mixed record of compliance is not surprising: human rights strategies ultimately challenge aspects of the prevailing model of
national development, and the political economy that sustains it. Any emancipatory strategy deployed in these circumstances would arguably be likely to
meet stiff resistance. And where material outcomes are disappointing, questions remain as to whether and how rights-claiming can still help move the
agenda forward in political and discursive terms. Indeed, even unenforced
judgments can produce consequences, for example if they help cement social

persistent state of uncertainty that draw [company] staff and the Sawhoyamaxa into conflict
over land control.”).
121
Id. at 74–76.
122
Duane W. Krohnke, Failed Efforts to Weaken the Inter-American Human Rights System Under the Guise of Reform, DWKCOMMENTARIES BLOG (Mar. 26, 2013), http://dwkcom
mentaries.com/2013/03/26/failed-efforts-to-weaken-the-inter-american-human-rights-syst
em-under-the-guise-of-reform/; Dinah Shelton, The Rules and the Reality of Petition Procedures in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 5 NOTRE DAME J. OF INT’L & COMP.
L. 1, 27–28 (2015).
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identities, catalyze public mobilization, reframe contested issues and ultimately shift public policy.123
In the Sawhoyamaxa case, for example, wielding the favorable InterAmerican Court judgment was reported to have featured prominently in social
mobilization, including to legitimize a land occupation that, while illegal under national law, would now be justified by the higher moral authority of international law, effectively reframing the issues at stake and “allowing indigenous peoples to transform cases of trespassing into land rights claims.”124
The land occupation in the aftermath of the Sawhoyamaxa judgment also illustrates how appropriating human rights can catalyse public mobilization in
ways that go significantly beyond the perimeter inscribed by a strict juristic
interpretation of the legal concepts at play: while juristic notions are necessarily central to the legal case, public mobilization around the litigation can
involve more far-reaching—and radical—social and discursive practices.125
In turn, this “reframing effect” of rights-claiming can generate repercussions well beyond the specific resource dispute the relevant case originally
referred to.126 This is not only because regional human rights institutions have
cross-referenced their own and each other’s decisions, leading to the progressive development of an authoritative body of international jurisprudence that
can have a bearing on large numbers of resource disputes.127 Outside of any
legal proceedings, indigenous peoples from different geographical and socioeconomic contexts have invoked advances in international human rights jurisprudence as part of their advocacy to persuade government agencies to recognize their natural resource claims.128
While highlighting both the conceptual and the material limitations of the
right to collective property, these jurisprudential and discursive developments
show that human rights have deeply contested meanings. They also show that
use of human rights in social struggles can push the boundaries of juristic interpretations, and ultimately shift the normative contours of human rights
themselves. And even a right that is so closely associated with the functioning
of the capitalist economy has been tactically appropriated and to some extent
reconfigured to challenge aspects of the natural resource extraction upon
which that economy rests.
123
CÉSAR RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, Beyond Enforcement: Assessing and Enhancing Judicial Impact, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JUDGMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE 75, 78–79 &
86–89 (Malcolm Langford, César Rodríguez-Garavito, & Julieta Rossi eds., 2017).
124
STRATEGIC LITIGATION IMPACTS, supra note 27, at 74.
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Id. at 21, 36.
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RODRÍGUEZ-GARAVITO, supra note 123, at 93.
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Cent. for Minority Rights Dev. ex rel. Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, No.
276/2003, Decision, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. and Peoples’ Rts. [Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.], ¶¶
159–162, 191 (Nov. 2009).
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See, e.g., NGUIFFO ET AL., supra note 81 (discussing the ACtHPR’s Ogiek judgment
in the context of policy advocacy by indigenous peoples in Cameroon).
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IV. “CONSTITUTIVE” HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGIES: THE STRUGGLE FOR
PEASANTS’ RIGHTS
A. Introductory Remarks
While reactive strategies mobilize imperfectly aligned human rights instruments to respond to a given problem or situation, constitutive strategies—
as conceived of in this study—aim to sustain systemic change at scale and in
the longer term, through creating new rights or reconfiguring existing ones.
In practice, border lines are blurred: as discussed, reactive strategies can shift
the normative content of human rights law, with potential implications beyond
the situation the action originally responded to.
Examples of constitutive strategies include the public mobilization that led
to the development of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,129 the harnessing of rights by social movements and NGOs
working to change the international legal and institutional architecture of food
and agriculture,130 and agrarian movements’ use of rights to articulate their
struggles over land, seeds and the global food regime.131 The rights-based advocacy of agrarian movements provides an insightful case study to interrogate
constitutive modes. The recent culmination of that advocacy in the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in
Rural Areas makes the case study a particularly timely one.132
B. Mapping the Terrain
In spite of skepticism for rights discourses and legal processes, agrarian
movements have long mobilized rights not only to challenge the building
blocks of economic ordering through “reactive” legal action in national and
129
See generally S.J. Rombouts, The Evolution of Indigenous Peoples’ Consultation
Rights Under the ILO and U.N. Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 169 (2017).
130
See Civil Society and Indigenous Peoples’ Mechanism for Relations with the UN
Committee on World Food Security, INT’L FOOD SEC. & NUTRITION CIVIL SOC’Y
MECHANISM, http://www.csm4cfs.org/ (last visited Feb. 29, 2020); see also Oliver De
Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Final Rep.: The Transformative Potential of the Right to Food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/57 (Jan. 24, 2014); Michael Fakhri,
Rethinking the Right to Good (Part Two), LEGAL FORUM (Sept. 10, 2018), https://legalform.
blog/2018/09/10/rethinking-the-right-to-food-part-two-michael-fakhri/; Tomaso Ferrando
& Jose Luis Vivero-Pol, Commons and ‘Commoning’: A ‘New’ Old Narrative to Enrich
the Food Sovereignty and Right to Food Claims, RIGHT TO FOOD & NUTRITION WATCH
(2017), https://www.righttofoodandnutrition.org/files/02.rtfanw-2017_eng_17_12_article
-5_web_rz.pdf (providing rights-based perspectives on the global food system).
131
See PRISCILLA CLAEYS, LA VIA CAMPESINA, FROM FOOD SOVEREIGNTY TO PEASANTS’
RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW OF VIA CAMPESINA’S STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS (2013),
https://www.viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2013/05/EN-02.pdf.
132
G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9.
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international spaces,133 but also to articulate the vision of a locally controlled
food system that significantly departs from prevailing forms. The international agrarian movement La Via Campesina has been at the forefront of these
efforts, deploying rights language in its own statements and declarations, and
advocating for a United Nations instrument that would affirm the rights of
peasants.134
This human rights advocacy has been inscribed in a wider process of transnational political mobilization that gained momentum from the 1990s, as a
reaction to the pressures that changing policy and market forces placed on
rural areas in many parts of the global South. Depending on the context, these
forces included structural adjustment, trade liberalization, the dumping of subsidized farm produce, and growing concentration in agricultural value chains
both upstream (e.g., seeds, machinery agrochemicals) and downstream (e.g.,
processing, distribution) of farming.135
In this context, re-appropriating the notion of “peasants” and advocating
for the international recognition of peasants’ human rights became part of a
“struggle among models” of agricultural development, and a vehicle to demand normative shifts towards a different economic paradigm.136 Perceived
gaps in the ability of existing human rights instruments to cater for the needs
and aspirations of rural people led agrarian movements to prioritize the creation of new human rights over the mobilization of existing ones, and to seek
to institutionalise conceptions of human rights that would depart from the liberal political tradition.137
A milestone in this process was the adoption, by La Via Campesina’s international conference in Maputo, 2008, of the “Declaration of Rights of Peasants – Women and Men.”138 This document represented the culmination of a
long-term process originating in village-level deliberations that took place in
Indonesia from the late 1990s.139 Under the leadership of national peasant
133

See, e.g., YUDHA FATHONI, INT’L INST. ENV’R & DEV., CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDONESIA’S INVESTMENT LAW (2014), http://pubs.iied.org/G0372
1/.
134
Marc Edelman & Carwil James, “Peasants’ Rights and the UN System: Quixotic
Struggle? Or Emancipatory Idea Whose Time Has Come? 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 1, 81
(2011); see also Priscilla Claeys, Food Sovereignty and the Recognition of New Rights for
Peasants at the UN: A Critical Overview of La Via Campesina’s Rights Claims over the
Last 20 Years, 12 GLOBALIZATIONS 4 (2014).
135
See Saturnino M. Borras Jr., The Politics of Transnational Agrarian Movements, 41
DEV. & CHANGE 5; see also Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 88–89.
136
Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 83, 92.
137
Id.; Claeys, supra note 134, at 2.
138
LA VIA CAMPESINA, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF PEASANTS – WOMEN AND MEN
(2009), https://viacampesina.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2011/03/Declaration-of-ri
ghts-of-peasants-2009.pdf.
139
See MANSOUR FAKIH ET. AL, INT’L INST. ENV’T & DEV., COMMUNITY INTEGRATED
PEST MANAGEMENT. IN INDONESIA: INSTITUTIONALIZING PARTICIPATION AND PEOPLE
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organization, and La Via Campesina member, Serikat Petani Indonesia, the
action was taken to the regional and then global level.140 This process of internationalization was not without challenges, due to the somewhat different
emphases and priorities in the advocacy led by La Via Campesina members
from different regions,141 but it ultimately federated the movement around a
clear set of demands. The Via Campesina Declaration provided a springboard
to advance, at the United Nations, a tailored human rights instrument that
would more fully align the international human rights system to the life experiences of rural people and small-scale rural producers.
Through alliances with supportive states, United Nations human rights
mandate holders, and human rights NGOs such as FIAN International and
CETIM, La Via Campesina worked to inscribe the issue on the agenda of the
United Nations Human Rights Council.142 In 2012, the Human Rights Council
established a working group to develop an international soft-law instrument
on the rights of peasants—the Open-Ended Inter-Governmental Working
Group on a United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other
People Working in Rural Areas.143 Over the years, the Working Group received extensive inputs from La Via Campesina and other international federations representing rural constituencies (pastoralists, indigenous peoples,
fishers, agricultural workers), supported by FIAN International and CETIM,
and by engaged academics.144 In September 2018, the Human Rights Council
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other
People Working in Rural Areas,145 and the United Nations General Assembly
followed suit in December 2018.146
While many high-income countries abstained or voted against the resolution both at the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly,147 this
CENTERED APPROACHES (2003), https://pubs.iied.org/9293IIED/?s=IP (particularly Annex
5 containing a draft of The Peasant’s Rights Charter).
140
Claeys, supra 134, at 5–6.
141
Id. at 458–459.
142
Priscilla Claeys, The Rise of New Rights for Peasants: From Reliance to NGO Intermediaries to Direct Representation, 9 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 386, 391–392 (2018).
143
Human Rights Council Res. 21/19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/19, at 2 (Oct. 11,
2012). The resolution was adopted with the votes of developing and transition economies
(23), while most European and North American states voted against (9), and fifteen states
abstained. Id.
144
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHE GOLAY, GENEVA ACAD. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF PEASANTS AND OTHER PEOPLE
WORKING IN RURAL AREAS (2013), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCou
ncil/WGPleasants/Golay.pdf.
145
Human Rights Council Res. 39/3, U.N. Doc A/HRC/39/L.16 (Sept. 26, 2018).
146
G.A. Res. 73/74(b) (Dec. 17, 2018).
147
At the Human Rights Council, Australia, Hungary and the United Kingdom voted
against, while Belgium, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Spain were among the
eleven states that abstained. See Human Rights Council Adopts Five Resolutions, Including
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outcome represents a remarkable success for an advocacy campaign that many
saw as facing an uphill struggle. The very recent adoption of the U.N. Declaration makes it impossible to draw conclusions on its effectiveness in catalysing the change agrarian movements sought. However, some initial reflections
on the text of the Declaration and the process that led to its adoption can shed
some light on the place of human rights in social justice advocacy.
C. Normative (Re)configurations
The United Nations Declaration is framed as a comprehensive document
that engages, through a human rights lens, the diverse arenas in which peasants and other people working in rural areas encounter the public policies and
business practices that shape the global food system. The Declaration tackles
“distributive” issues such as control of the means of production, and the parameters of trading relations, but it also embodies concerns about recognition
and representation.148 These concerns are partly reflected in the Declaration’s
re-appropriation of the notion of “peasants,” and its emphasis on the special
circumstances of peasants and their particularly strong connection to rural
lands. This is particularly explicit in the Via Campesina Declaration, which
defines “peasant” as “a man or woman of the land,”149 but it is also present in
the U.N. Declaration, which refers to peasants’ “special dependency on and
attachment to the land.”150
According to the U.N. Declaration, a peasant is
any person who engages or who seeks to engage alone, or in
association with others or as a community, in small-scale agricultural production for subsistence and/or for the market, and
who relies significantly, though not necessarily exclusively, on
family or household labour and other non-monetized ways of

on Burundi, Syria, and on the Rights of Peasants, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMM. (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx
?NewsID=23660&LangID=E. At the General Assembly, Australia, Hungary, Israel, New
Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States were among the eight states
that voted against, while Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain were among the
fifty-four that abstained. See U.N. GAOR, 73rd Sess., 55th plen. mtg., at 25, U.N. DOC.
A/73/PV.55 (Dec. 17, 2018).
148
See also Claeys, supra 134, at 9.
149
LA VIA CAMPESINA, supra note 138, at art. 1, ¶ 1.
150
G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 1.
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organizing labour, and who has a special dependency on and
attachment to the land.151
This definition covers wide-ranging livelihood strategies spanning the
spectrum of subsistence to commercial agriculture, with key defining features
including the small scale of operation, the significant reliance on family or
otherwise non-monetised labour, and the special relation to the land.
In line with the constitutive nature of the strategy, the U.N. Declaration
establishes significant departures from existing human rights forms. Following on the strong definitional connection the Declaration draws between peasants and land, the Declaration’s substantive provisions place considerable emphasis on the relation between human rights on the one hand, and the land and
resource rights of peasants and other people working in rural areas on the
other. While all rights are indivisible and the Declaration explicitly rules out
hierarchies of rights,152 it nonetheless seems significant that, in the outline of
the Declaration, the right of peasants and other people working in rural areas
“to have access to . . . the natural resources . . . that are required to enjoy adequate living conditions”153 precedes the affirmation of other rights such as the
rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and security of person.154
In addition, the U.N. Declaration affirms that peasants and other people
living in rural areas have a right to land, both individually and collectively.155
This includes the right “to achieve an adequate standard of living, to have a
place to live in security, peace and dignity and to develop their cultures.”156
The right to land is subject to limitations that are determined by law, that comply with international human rights obligations, and that are necessary to respect the rights of others or for “meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic society.”157
It should be noted that the close relation between land and human rights
has long been recognized, including in the international jurisprudence discussed in Section III. Examples of most obviously relevant human rights include the rights to property, to housing, to food (where people depend on natural resources for their food security), to enjoy one’s own culture (where
traditional cultures are connected to land and resources) and to self-determination, as well as indigenous peoples’ rights to their ancestral territories, to
name but a few internationally recognized human rights. That said, all human

151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id. at annex, ¶ 5.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 6.
Id. at art. 17, ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. at art. 28, ¶ 2.
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rights are interdependent and interrelated, so the interface between land rights
and human rights encompasses all internationally recognized human rights.158
With a few exceptions,159 however, the relationship between land and human rights has traditionally been a mediated one, for example by the role land
plays in enabling human rights holders to enjoy tangible or intangible goods
such as housing, food, and culture. While the full implications of the U.N.
Declaration will depend on how it is interpreted and applied, a “right to land”
establishes a more direct relationship between people and land, reflecting the
importance of land and natural resources in the lives of peasants and other
people working in rural areas.
In fact, while earlier human rights instruments partly frame land issues in
the context of strategies to implement other more fundamental human rights,
such as the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to be free from
hunger,160 the U.N. Declaration inverts that relationship by inscribing the attainment of an adequate standard of living within the framework of an encompassing human right to land—though the Declaration also recognizes a separate, free-standing right to an adequate standard of living for peasants and their
families.161
Unlike the right to property, which—like the right to land—arguably establishes a more immediate connection between land and human rights, the
right to land provides more explicit normative foundations for redistributive
agrarian reform, provided the reform complies with the significant qualifications established in the U.N. Declaration itself, such as “securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others.”162 Indeed, in addition
to requiring states to recognize the land tenure rights of peasants and people
working in rural areas, including “customary land tenure rights not currently
protected by law,” and to protect peasants from arbitrary eviction, the U.N.
Declaration calls on states, “where appropriate,” to take “appropriate

158
On the relation between land rights and human rights, see Oliver De Schutter, The
Emerging Human Right to Land, 12 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 303 (2010); Jeremie Gilbert, Land Rights as Human Rights: The Case for a Specific Right to Land, 18 SUR-INT’L
J. ON HUM. RTS. 113 (2014); Cotula, supra note 8; Kaitlin Cordes, Is There a Human Right
to Land?, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2017), https://blogs.ei.columb
ia.edu/2017/11/08/is-owning-land-a-human-right/.
159
See, e.g., Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, arts. 13–19, 1650 U.N.T.S. 384.
160
For example, in recognizing the “fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger,” states are required to take a range of necessary measures, as relevant, including “reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development of
natural resources.” International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 11, ¶ 2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
161
G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 16.
162
Id. at art. 28.
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measures to carry out agrarian reforms in order to facilitate the broad and equitable access to land and other natural resources.”163
The Declaration’s emphasis on peasants’ access to means of production
such as land and natural resources also emerges in other novel human rights
configurations. For example, the Declaration affirms peasants’ “right to
seeds,” which is defined to include protection of traditional knowledge and
the right to save, use, exchange and sell their farm-saved seeds.164 Even wellestablished human rights acquire new productive dimensions when applied to
the specific circumstances of peasants and other people working in rural areas.
In reaffirming the right to seek, receive, develop and impart information, for
example, the Declaration clarifies that this right includes “information about
factors that may affect the production, processing, marketing and distribution
of [peasants’] products.”165
Similarly, the right to adequate standards of living is connected to a right
“to facilitated access to the means of production necessary to achieve them,
including production tools, technical assistance, credit, insurance and other
financial services,” as well as “appropriate measures to favor the access of
peasants and other people working in rural areas to the means of transportation
and the processing, drying and storage facilities necessary for selling their
products on local, national and regional markets at prices that guarantee them
a decent income and livelihood.”166
Besides this emphasis on the concrete, productive dimensions of food and
agriculture and the real-life factors that affect rural livelihoods and the structure of agricultural value chains, the Declaration also pays significant attention to the voice of peasants and other working rural people in public decision
making. For example, through a carefully worded provision that essentially
calls on states to ensure that peasants and other people working in rural areas
can have a say in decisions that could affect them,167 and by recognising the
163

Id. at art. 17, ¶¶ 3, 6.
Id. at art. 17, 19. The wording of the Declaration echoes the preamble of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, which refers to “the
rights recognized in this Treaty to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and other
propagating material.” Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303.
165
G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 11, ¶ 1.
166
Id. at art. 16, ¶¶ 1–2.
167
The provision states:
Without disregarding specific legislation on indigenous peoples, before
adopting and implementing legislation and policies, international agreements and other decision-making processes that may affect the rights of
peasants and other people working in rural areas, States shall consult and
cooperate in good faith with peasants and other people working in rural
areas through their own representative institutions, engaging with and
seeking the support of peasants and other people working in rural areas
who could be affected by decisions before those decisions are made, and
responding to their contributions, taking into consideration existing
164
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role of “strong and independent” organizations representative of peasants and
people working in rural areas.168 The concern about voice in decision making
arguably applies across—without being necessarily limited to—the wide
spectrum of issues the U.N. Declaration explicitly addresses, including the
above-mentioned provisions dealing with control over land and natural resources.
On one level, the normative contours of the U.N. Declaration reflect an
attempt to translate the implications of internationally recognized human
rights to the specific circumstances of peasants and other people working in
rural areas. Indeed, the preamble of the Declaration explicitly refers to several
key international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a number of treaties and soft-law instruments, reaffirming important elements of the international human rights law acquis,
such as the universality, indivisibility, interrelatedness, and interdependence
of all human rights.169
However, this brief discussion of a few illustrative provisions exemplifies
how the Declaration departs in significant ways from established human rights
instruments. In effect, its cumulative provisions sustain a “right to produce
food” that differs from the prevalent emphasis on food access and consumption that characterizes, for example, much international jurisprudence on the
right to adequate food.170
This “right to produce” emerges from the Declaration’s specific provisions
dealing with control over land, seeds, and the means of production, along with
the place of small-scale rural producers in agricultural value chains, discussed
above. But it also emerges, in more general terms, from the emphasis the Declaration places on the value of work, which is reflected in the very title of the
document (referring to people working in rural areas), in the Declaration’s
definitional provisions (as discussed, peasants are defined by their reliance on
family or household labour171), and in the substantive parts of the

power imbalances between different parties and ensuring active, free, effective, meaningful and informed participation of individuals and groups
in associated decision-making processes.
Id. at art. 2, ¶ 3.
168
Id. at art. 10.
169
Id. at preamble, ¶¶ 2–5.
170
Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 85. However, the link between the right to food
and agrarian reform has long been recognized. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 11, ¶ 2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. The U.N.
Declaration also affirms the right to adequate food and to be free from hunger, which is
defined in terms of “physical and economic access at all times to sufficient and adequate
food,” but which also explicitly includes the “right to produce food.” G.A. Res. 73/165,
supra note 9, at art. 15.
171
The Declaration applies to persons engaged in broadly defined agricultural activities,
such as “artisanal or small-scale agriculture, crop planting, livestock raising, pastoralism,
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Declaration.172 More than establishing safety nets for secure access to basic
goods such as food and housing, the U.N. Declaration affirms the agency of
peasants and rural people in the face of the often inequitable economic relations that affect production and trading.
These departures in human rights configurations partly correlate to differences between diverse ideational and normative paradigms of agriculture and
food systems. Crudely put, existing human rights instruments are broadly consistent with the concept of food security, which also provides the basis for the
normative and operational activities of the specialized agencies, funds and
programs of the United Nations system that have explicit institutional mandates for food and agriculture. In contrast, the overall framing of the U.N.
Declaration correlates more closely with the public advocacy agrarian movements that have long operated around the notion of food sovereignty, which
emphasises local control over agricultural production and food systems.173
While the U.N. Declaration ultimately falls short of affirming a full-fledged
right to food sovereignty, it does articulate its key elements within the structure of the rights it recognizes, and it asserts that “[p]easants and other people
working in rural areas have the right to determine their own food and agriculture systems, recognized by many States and regions as the right to food sovereignty.”174
Despite the significant textual differences that exist between the Via Campesina and U.N. Declarations, many of the novel human rights configurations
embodied in the U.N. Declaration are partly rooted in concepts that were originally developed in the Via Campesina Declaration. For example, the Via
Campesina Declaration contains provisions on the “right to land and territory,” the “right to seeds” and the “right to information.”175 While some other
provisions of the Via Campesina Declaration have no full equivalents in the
U.N. Declaration,176 this trajectory of normative development highlights the
role of social movements in the development of international instruments, and

fishing, forestry, hunting or gathering, and handicrafts related to agriculture.” G.A. Res.
73/165, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 2.
172
See, e.g., id. at art. 13.
173
MICHAEL WINDFUHR & JENNIE JONSÉN, FOOD SOVEREIGNTY: TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN LOCALIZED FOOD SYSTEMS 13 (2005); Olivier de Schutter, Food Sovereignty a Critical
Dialogue, TRANSNATIONAL INST. (Feb. 26, 2014), https://www.tni.org/en/article/olivier-de
-schutter-food-sovereignty-a-critical-dialogue. For an articulation of food sovereignty, see
Nyleni Declaration, FORUM ON FOOD SOVEREIGNTY (2007), https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/D
eclNyeleni-en.pdf and the commentary in Claeys, supra note 142, at 454–58.
174
G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 8, ¶ 4; see also id. at art. 15, ¶5; id. at preamble,
¶ 24.
175
LA VIA CAMPESINA, supra note 138, at arts. IV–V, VII.
176
For example, the “right to obtain funds from the State to develop agriculture.” Id. at
art. VI, ¶ 1.
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the relevance of a bottom-up perspective to interrogating the place of human
rights in social justice struggles.177
D. Preliminary Appraisal
As with the international jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ rights, the
development and adoption of the U.N. Declaration has raised multifaceted issues that interrogate the interface between human rights and social justice. In
building on advocacy led by transnational social movements, and on concepts
and even texts developed by those movements prior to the institutionalized
inter-governmental process, the U.N. Declaration presents the distinctive contours of international (soft) law making from the bottom up.178 And while
global advocacy translating grassroots-level social justice demands into international human rights claims has often relied on “intermediaries” such as nongovernmental human rights organizations, in this case a transnational peasant
movement representing millions of rural people directly led the advocacy
from local to global levels—with NGOs and engaged academics characterized
as primarily providing technical and logistical support.179 These reconfigured
roles of the movements and their allies outline a different approach to agency
and representation in international policy spaces, and to channelling advocacy
from local to global arenas.
Substantively, the text of the U.N. Declaration departs from established
human rights approaches and establishes a strong relation between social justice claims and human rights norms. This relation is reflected, for example, in
the emphasis the Declaration places on collective rights, on control over the
means of production and agricultural value chains, on the intimate connection
many rural people experience with their land and resources, and on the place
of work as a source of social identity. The provisions of the Declaration that
deal with control over land, seeds, and market systems embody a challenge to
prevailing economic structures, and their full implementation would change
the way agriculture and food systems are presently organised.
This does not mean that questions have not been asked about the real
emancipatory potential of some of the Declaration’s provisions, and diverse
ideational matrices appear to coexist in the tapestry of the Declaration. Critical
analyses have highlighted internal tensions within the text, pointing to some
provisions that could indirectly reinforce, or at least presuppose and
177

On social movements and international law, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, CounterHegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and Development as a Third
World Strategy, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 767 (2006). For a discussion of bottom-up perspectives in international human rights law, see Basak Bagalayan, Searching for Human Rights
Norms for Corporate Conduct in Domestic Jurisprudence: A Bottom-Up Approach to International Law, 36 NORDIC J. HUM. RTS. 371 (2018).
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See generally Rajagopal, supra note 177.
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Claeys, supra note 142, at 394–97.
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recognize, features of prevailing economic ordering.180 For example, the Declaration conditions the commercial exploitation of resources on which peasants depend to the conduct of impact assessments, to good-faith consultation
and to “fair and equitable” benefit sharing.181 Seemingly inspired to the international jurisprudence on indigenous peoples’ right to collective property,
which as discussed was primarily developed in a reactive rather than constitutive mode, these requirements are ultimately consistent with the penetration
of commercial forms of production—so long as the specific conditions set are
complied with.
Further, institutionalisation may raise new challenges for a process that has
so far relied on social movements’ agency. As a soft-law instrument, the U.N.
Declaration will undoubtedly require continued public advocacy if its provisions are to have any follow-through. However, the existence of an internationally negotiated normative text establishes authoritative parameters the interpretation of which is no longer under the movements’ exclusive control,
making the concepts, and the norms, more vulnerable to reinterpretation and
possibly co-option.
From a sociological perspective, the notion of peasantry has formed the
object of extensive debates,182 both scholarly and activist, stemming from the
considerable diversity of contexts, from the social differentiation that typically exists in rural areas, of the blurred lines between rural and urban worlds,
and from overlapping and often shifting registers of social identity.183 In addition, how the Declaration will be used and implemented in practice, including in national policy contexts, remains to be seen, and its non-binding nature
would be expected to reduce its effectiveness in addressing entrenched socioeconomic injustices, including those that are rooted in imbalances within hard
law.184
Overall, however, there is little doubt that the adoption of the U.N. Declaration constitutes an important milestone in the appropriation of human rights
in the context of social justice struggles. This milestone offers a reminder that
the catalogue of internationally recognized human rights is the product of
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Margot E. Salomon, Nihilists, Pragmatists and Peasants: A Dispatch on Contradiction in International Human Rights Law (NYU Law Sch. Inst. of Int’l Law & Justice,
Working Paper No. 2018/5, 2018), https://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Salo
mon-IILJ_2018_5-Megareg.pdf.
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G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. V.
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Edelman & James, supra note 134, at 82.
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See, e.g., G.A. Res. 73/165, supra note 9, at art. 1, ¶ 3 (clarifying application to indigenous peoples “working the land” and thus raising questions about overlapping identities
and legal regimes).
184
See generally Cotula, supra note 87 (discussing imbalances present in the interplay of
domestic and international law); Cotula, supra note 8 (discussing those imbalances, and
the limitations of attempts to address these through “soft” law).
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historically determined negotiation processes,185 that the configuration of human rights may significantly depart from the traditional liberal canon, and that
human rights can provide arenas for activists to seek to renegotiate important
aspects of socio-economic ordering.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Human Rights: Intellectual Histories, Legal Configurations, and Social
Practices
Critiques of human rights have traction because they identify real challenges. They also raise deeper questions about how ideas are developed, renegotiated and mobilized to inform action and sustain change. While extremely different in the legal concepts they deploy, the socio-political
trajectories they embody, and the “reactive” and “constitutive” strategies they
pursue, the two case studies explored in this article exemplify efforts to mobilize human rights for social justice advocacy. Both reflect significant
“wins,” whether in the form of public interest litigation or international (soft)
law making. Yet both also beg difficult questions about the real scale of the
advances made, and whether these advances can ultimately transform socioeconomic relations.
The issue is not just that it is difficult for social actors to secure international judgments or declarations, or to properly enforce or implement them
once they have been obtained, particularly in the face of powerful vested interests. The more probing question is whether even a properly implemented
ruling or instrument would meaningfully reshape socio-economic ordering.
Taken alone, a few judgments do not reverse the long history of mass dispossession affecting indigenous lands, and an international soft-law instrument
does not alter entrenched patterns of land ownership, the international protection of intellectual property rights affecting the governance of seed systems,
or the structure of agricultural value chains. By resorting to the instruments of
positive law, social actors must translate their demands into conceptual categories—such as the right to property—that are associated with dominant economic and political organization.
In harnessing such hegemonic concepts in counter-hegemonic terms,186
and in locating social justice advocacy within institutionalized human rights
processes, strategies to “juridify” inherently political disputes must operate
“within the system.” They may entail advocated-for and even actually
185
Sofía Monsalve Suárez, The Human Rights Framework in Contemporary Agrarian
Struggles, 40 J. PEASANT STUD. 239, 241–242 (2013).
186
Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J.L. &
SOC’Y. 309 (1990); see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law and Hegemony: A
Reconfiguration, 17 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 197 (2004).
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observed reforms, as illustrated by the jurisprudential reconfiguration of the
right to property in the light of legal categories that resonate with indigenous
conceptions. But they do not necessarily challenge the foundational parameters of the system. Indeed, the mobilizing and even the reconfiguring ultimately rest on the acceptance of the very state-centric international system of
control over natural resources and development pathways that is instrumental
to advancing commercial modes of production and to the dispossession of
peasants and indigenous peoples in many parts of the world. While the two
case studies illustrate bottom-up agency by indigenous and agrarian movements, states played important roles in both, whether as bearers of human
rights obligations and respondents in human rights litigation, or as negotiators
and adopters of international soft law.
While the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Peasants exemplifies radical departures from the established human rights canon, crystallizing
concepts into legal texts and subjecting them to the techniques of legal interpretation can inherently limit the emancipatory potential of the rights at play.
As regional human rights institutions have expressly acknowledged, from a
legal standpoint, even duly recognized and protected collective rights to natural resources can be overridden by measures taken in the exercise of state
sovereignty, so long as those measures comply with the safeguards established
by international law. In fact, there are questions as to whether, in articulating
demands through legal notions that are so deeply implicated with the status
quo, advocacy strategies may become more vulnerable to capture—for example, with contestation framed in property terms paving the way to processes,
such as land demarcation and registration, that could ultimately compound the
commodification of natural resource relations. There are also questions as to
whether the disconnections between the normative and the experienced, and
between the law in the books and in practice, might create expectations that
are inevitably difficult to meet, and thus cause frustration and demoralization
among social actors, and possibly short-circuit relations that could have sustained alternative empowerment pathways.
However, the use of internationally recognized human rights in discursive
strategies and social processes can transcend the juristic limitations of the legal concepts at play. In both case studies, human rights language and processes are embedded in wider public mobilization, with institutionalized proceedings (court litigation, inter-governmental negotiations) being sustained
by, and sustaining, social and discursive practices. While mutually reinforcing, legal actions and social practices may reflect distinctive ways to conceptualise and mobilize human rights, and the intersections between the two can
affect both jurisprudential and material outcomes.
Indeed, where activists appropriate human rights to catalyse public mobilization, the scope of the resulting action is not necessarily restricted to the
perimeter delineated by jurisprudential interpretations of international human
rights law. The experience of the Sawhoyamaxa community occupying its
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traditional lands now under commercial operations exemplifies how social actors can shift registers—moving from legal proceedings to direct action—in
different times and places, while also using the human rights register to legitimize land occupations that would otherwise contravene positive law.
In these regards, any assessments of the emancipatory potential of human
rights in social justice struggles cannot be limited to a discussion of the ways
in which those rights have been construed by drafters, tribunals and jurists, or
of the intellectual origins and cultural matrices that have affected the historical
development of human rights law. While legal experts will be primarily concerned with the techniques of legal drafting and interpretation, emancipatory
potential is a function of a wider range of socio-political as well as juridical
variables.
Therefore, those assessments would also need to consider how human
rights are appropriated in socio-political arenas, where discursive practices
may create ruptures with established ideational matrices and departures from
the traditional canons of juristic interpretation. Considering these practices
would require broadening the methods of inquiry to pursue a more grounded
understanding of rights in their social context. To different extents and in different ways, both the indigenous rights jurisprudence and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Peasants indicate that this “activist” use of human
rights can ultimately sustain evolutions in normative configurations, via jurisprudential interpretations and international (soft) law making, thereby intersecting with, and cross-fertilizing, the traditional purview of doctrinal analyses.
In these respects, the two case studies call for expanding the horizons of
current debates about the relation between human rights and social justice.
While public debates have often focused on the work of mainstream human
rights organizations based in the global North, both examples highlight the
prominent role that social movements that are at least partly located in the
global South—including actors that do not primarily identify themselves as
human rights organizations—have played in developing distinctive modes to
invoke and reshape human rights in pursuit of social justice.
B. From Human Rights Frameworks to Rights-Claiming as a Practice of
Contestation
This broadening of the horizon of inquiry adds new insights to existing
debates and nuances to some recurring themes in the critique of rights. For
example, while some of the critique pointed to the unwillingness or inability
of human rights approaches to tackle economic inequality and wider social
justice issues, in both case studies social actors have established human rights
as a site for contesting aspects of socio-economic ordering, even though ultimately with mixed practical results.
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While some scholarly work has associated human rights with meeting
“basic needs” through a minimum level of access to certain goods and services,187 in both case studies advocacy is about recognition, voice, and historical redress, as much as it is about ensuring that material needs are met. This
circumstance offers a reminder that realising human rights is ultimately about
increasing control over an individual’s or group’s life, which may require
transformational change in social, economic and political structures. This perspective aligns with shifts in public understanding of poverty and deprivation,
which for a long time were framed primarily if not exclusively in terms of
access to material goods, and are now widely recognized to be multi-dimensional phenomena that can be underpinned by marginalization and lack of
voice, as well as low incomes.188
The emphasis that agrarian and indigenous peoples’ movements have
placed on collective rights also questions assumptions about the supposedly
inherently individualistic and individualising nature of human rights. Further,
while much public debate on the interface between human rights and social
justice has focused on relations within national polities, or in relations among
states (e.g., in connection with demands for a New International Economic
Order), the case studies illustrate how social movements have also wielded
human rights to contest the transnational arrangements that underpin the contemporary global economy.
This harnessing of human rights by indigenous and agrarian movements
illustrates the need to re-center the debates about the emancipatory potential
of human rights from institutionalized human rights actors and frameworks to
rights-claiming as a practice of contestation. In this perspective, invoking human rights may constitute a channel for social actors to articulate a rupture
with aspects of socio-political ordering,189 as much as a juridical avenue for
producing legally enforceable outcomes to change a given material situation.
Human rights are therefore viewed as both vehicles and outcomes of political
struggle, and their development is, at least in part, the story of how social
actors—including groups that do not primarily define their institutional mandates in human rights terms—have appropriated rights language and instruments to advance their agendas.
This perspective outlines a different set of dimensions in the practice of
human rights, one where legal forms are embedded in social processes and
where human rights are advanced, at least in part, through the vision, resolve
187
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and action of social groups. In addition, the import and effectiveness of rightsclaiming are to be assessed not only in terms of judicial, legislative, or even
material outcomes, but also in relation to the ways in which advocacy can use
human rights to legitimize counter-hegemonic worldviews and catalyse collective action.190
These considerations apply in different ways to reactive and constitutive
strategies, and failure to disaggregate the discussion can lead to analytical
confusion. In reactive modes, the main concern may be about addressing a
specific situation or pattern of human rights abuse. In many situations, this
reactive rights-claiming will reflect a principled position that fundamentally
espouses the framing of the human rights being invoked. But recourse to human rights in reactive mode can also be instrumental and even opportunistic.
It can be a vehicle for achieving certain goals, even if activating rights processes may require accepting normative or juridical configurations, such as
the right to property, that contrast with the ultimate vision of relevant social
actors, or that seem removed from the daily realities those actors experience.
Rather than inevitably revealing limited ambition in the underlying social
change agendas, these circumstances may reflect pragmatic tactical choices
driven by immediate imperatives, such as the need to anchor advocacy to legal
rights that are formally recognized and effectively protected by applicable
positive law.
In constitutive modes, on the other hand, recourse to human rights may
have more foundational and normative connotations, there may be more space
for more explicit ruptures with prevailing juridical arrangements. This does
not necessarily mean that the substantive social justice demands are themselves qualitatively more radical than in reactive modes, and if the advocacy
translates into formalised inter-governmental processes it may have to come
to terms with the compromises that tend to characterise international negotiations and law making. But when articulating social justice demands in constitutive human rights modes, advocates are less constrained by established human rights forms, and they may enjoy greater latitude in aligning human rights
concepts with their own social justice goals.
C. Rights-Claiming in Contested Socio-Political Terrains
The limitations in the material outcomes of both reactive and constitutive
strategies, discussed above, provide a cautionary tale about the real difference
human rights can make in hotly contested socio-political terrains. However,
they also reflect the fact that rights-claiming can get in the way of national
development models and of transnational economic relations premised on
large-scale resource exploitation, and it can upset powerful interests from local to global levels.
190
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The political backlashes the Inter-American Court cases triggered in several Latin American countries, and the repression many human rights defenders have suffered for their advocacy in the face of agribusiness and extractive
industry projects worldwide, particularly in the context of shrinking political
spaces,191 are a reminder of the complex political economies of vested interests and power relations that rights-claiming may be confronted with. In such
political economy contexts, social justice advocacy—whether or not based on
human rights—can meet stiff and often brutal opposition, change is an inevitably slow and difficult process, and the ultimate outcomes may differ considerably from those advocated for.
The association between rights-claiming and socio-political contestation is
also apparent on the ideational plane. Both case studies illustrate how rightsclaiming can situate struggles in the realm of ideas, as much as in political and
economic organization, and seek to subvert the cultural subjugation that is
often associated with socio-political marginalization. Social movements’ reclaiming the notion of “peasants,” their asserting the intimate connection between people and land, and their aiming to shift public narratives about development paradigms all challenge ingrained prejudices about the
“backwardness,” or “modernity,” of different systems of livelihoods and beliefs, and of different forms of natural resource use. Such prejudices underpin
the structural discrimination that peasants and indigenous peoples experience
in many legal systems,192 so the ideational plane intersects with the juristic
and material dimensions.
On these ideological battlegrounds, different conceptions of human rights
can come directly into contest—for example, where the commercial actors
that resist indigenous peoples’ land restitution claims invoke the right to property to protect their own assets. These situations can expose tensions between
different conceptions of the right to property—such as those premised on a
deeply felt socio-cultural bond between people and land, and those that emphasise security of market transactions and the place of land in productive
activities. The diverse ideational matrices of human rights can coexist within
the same jurisprudential approach or legal instrument. For instance, the notions of prior consultation and benefit sharing, developed by the Inter-American Court in reactive mode, could ultimately operate in ways that are coextensive with extractivist models. In an example of apparent norm diffusion,
these notions penetrated the formulation of a new human rights instrument
advocated for in constitutive terms, namely the U.N. Declaration on the Rights
of Peasants, which in other respects embodies a more fundamental departure
from prevailing human rights practices.
These considerations point to the impossibility of interrogating the human
rights and social justice interface in connection with an encompassing and
191
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undifferentiated human rights “project,” or “movement,” as doing this would
obscure the contested and evolving nature of human rights, and the different
and often contrasting strands of human rights thought and action. Such an encompassing and undifferentiated framing risks marginalising the practices and
the voices of certain actors, particularly those located at the grassroots, in geographic and economic global peripheries, or at the fringes of the human
rights “movement.”
Critique is the engine of change, so it is essential that social justice (and
human rights) thinkers and practitioners continuously interrogate their assumptions and approaches and, where necessary, reorient them accordingly.
Critiques of rights both old and new have exposed human rights’ limitations—
whether structural or contingent—in promoting more just socio-economic relations. They have established a challenge for advocates to develop ever more
ambitious and effective human rights practices, and to explore alternative or
complementary strategies to comprehensively address social justice challenges. At the same time, there is a need to broaden current debates to more
plural perspectives that recognize the diversity of human rights actors, agendas, arenas and approaches, and to open spaces for more fully engaging with
the practices of actors located outside the human rights mainstream. By seeking to understand how diverse social actors have appropriated and reimagined
human rights from the bottom up, it might become possible to ask different
questions about whether and how human rights can sustain emancipatory action.

